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INTRODUCTION
NSANITY defense jurisprudence has long been in a state of
chaos.' Some have responded to this unfortunate situation by
calling for abolition of the defense,2 while others have tinkered fur-
ther with its scope.3 This Article proposes what amounts to an
* Stephen C. O'Connell Professor of Law, University of Florida Fredric G. Levin
College of Law; A.B. Princeton University; J.D., LL.M., University of Virginia. For
their comments on an earlier version of this Article, the author would like to thank
Scott Altman, Jody Armour, Thomas Griffith, Martin Levine, Tom Lyon, Edward
McCaffrey, Stephen Morse, Michael Perlin, Elyn Saks, Robert Schopp, Dan Simon,
David Slawson, Ralph Slovenko, Alan Stone, Eric Talley, and David Wexler.
'As long ago as 1925, Sheldon Glueck stated:
Perhaps in no other branch of American law [is] there so much disagreement as
to fundamentals and so many contradictory decisions in the same jurisdictions.
Not a modem text or compilation begins the discussion of the subject of
insanity and its relation to the criminal law without a doleful reference to the
chaos in this field.
S. Sheldon Glueck, Mental Disorder and the Criminal Law: A Study in Medico-
Sociological Jurisprudence 187-88 (1925). Almost seventy years later, Michael Perlin
began his book-length treatment of the insanity defense with the assertion that "[o]ur
insanity defense jurisprudence is incoherent." Michael L. Perlin, The Jurisprudence of
the Insanity Defense 1 (1994).
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intermediate position. It argues that insanity should be eliminated
as a separate defense, but that the effects of mental disorder should
still carry significant moral weight. More specifically, mental illness
should be relevant in assessing culpability only as warranted by
general criminal law doctrines concerning mens rea, self-defense
and duress.
While a few scholars and courts have toyed with this idea,' it has
yet to be fully endorsed or coherently defended by any of them.
This Article provides such a defense. It contends that, both morally
and practically, the most appropriate manner of recognizing mental
illness's mitigating impact in criminal cases is to recast mental dis-
order as a factor relevant to the general defenses, rather than treat
it as a predicate for a special defense.
The starting point for this claim is the retributive principle that
blameworthiness should be the predominant guidepost of the
criminal law. One can imagine a system, as Lady Wootton has,
2 See, e.g., Abraham L. Halpern, The Politics of the Insanity Defense, 14 Am. J. Fo-
rensic Psychiatry 3, 4 (1993); Joseph Weintraub, Comments at the Annual Judicial
Conference of the Second Judicial Circuit of the United States, Insanity as a Defense:
A Panel Discussion, 37 F.R.D. 365,372-73 (1964). Most who have called for abolition
of the defense continue to support the so-called "mens rea" alternative, which would
permit the introduction of evidence about mental disorder to prove the absence of
mens rea. See, e.g., Norval Morris, Madness and the Criminal Law 53-76 (1982);
American Medical Association Committee on Medicolegal Problems, Insanity De-
fense in Criminal Trials and Limitation of Psychiatric Testimony: Report of the Board
of Trustees, 251 JAMA 2967 (1984); Joseph Goldstein & Jay Katz, Abolish the "In-
sanity Defense"-Why Not? 72 Yale L.J. 853 (1963). Five states have abolished the
defense, while maintaining the mens rea alternative. See Idaho Code § 18-207 (1997);
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 22-3220 (1995); Mont. Code Ann. § 46-14-214 (1999); Nev. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 174.035 (Michie 1997); Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-305 (1999).
3 See, e.g., Abraham S. Goldstein, The Insanity Defense 214-19 (1967) (arguing for
a "broadened" test); Richard J. Bonnie, The Moral Basis of the Insanity Defense, 69
A.B.A. J. 194, 197 (1983) (arguing for abolition of the volitional prong of the de-
fense); Criminal Justice Mental Health Standards, Standards 7-6.1, 7-6.9, &
commentary (1989) (arguing for abolition of the volitional prong of the defense or a
lower standard of proof with respect to that prong). Several commentators have ar-
gued for an irrationality test or some version thereof. See infra notes 50-55.
41Tose scholars who advocate the mens rea alternative, see supra note 2, could be
said to adopt a very narrow version of this approach. See also Joel Feinberg, Doing
and Deserving: Essays in the Theory of Responsibility 272-89 (1970) (stating that
"[m]ental illness should not itself be an independent ground of exculpation, but only a
sign that one of the traditional standard grounds-compulsion, ignorance of fact, or
excusable ignorance of law-may apply," but primarily describing "lingering doubts"
about this approach). Some courts have come somewhat closer to adopting this ap-
proach, but with virtually no explanation. See infra text accompanying note 38.
1200 [Vol. 86:1199
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which is agnostic about culpability and focused on prevention and
treatment In such a world we would not need to talk about the in-
sanity defense, because autonomy or its absence would be relevant,
if at all, only in determining whether a person has sufficient control
to avoid offending in the future. The reason Lady Wootton's ap-
proach has not gained significant ground is that a world in which
the government imposes harsh penalties without considering
blameworthiness is morally repugnant to many people.' The hu-
man urge to condemn those who have done wrong is strong; at the
same time, it is considered fundamentally unfair to visit such con-
demnation on a person who is not "culpable."7 Even if that
noninstrumental position is wrong8 -because moral condemnation
is the role of spiritual rather than secular entities, because culpabil-
ity is not a necessary basis for condemnation, or because "hard"
determinists are right that everything we do is inevitable and cul-
pability is thus a meaningless concept-the state should act as if
blameworthiness can be measured, to enhance the perception that
our decisions about conduct matter and concomitantly encourage
law-abiding behavior.9
5 See Barbara Wootton, Crime and the Criminal Law: Reflections of a Magistrate
and Social Scientist 32-57 (1963).
See Paul H. Robinson, The Criminal-Civil Distinction and the Utility of Desert, 76
B.U. L. Rev. 201,205-08 (1996) (noting that virtually every society maintains a sepa-
rate criminal justice system and speculating that this is because a system based on
moral condemnation is a universally important component of humankind); see also
Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Justice, Liability, and Blame: Community Views
and the Criminal Law 208-09 (1995) (finding that participants in surveys consistently
grade liability along a continuum based on assessments of culpability).
7 See H.L.A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility: Essays in the Philosophy of Law
47 (1968) (arguing that excusing conditions are necessary to "maximize the individ-
ual's power at any time to predict the likelihood that the sanctions of the criminal law
will be applied to him" and to "introduce the individual's choice as one of the opera-
tive factors determining whether or not these sanctions shall be applied to him");
Donald H.J. Hermann, The Insanity Defense: Philosophical, Historical and Legal
Perspectives 93-94 (1983) ("Elimination of the principle of responsibility would result
in every attitude, disposition, or accidental movement seen by the state as undesir-
able, becoming a potential source of coercive intervention' in the life of any and every
citizen no matterhow well intentioned he might be.").
81 have argued that this position is wrong, at least in the juvenile context. See Chris-
topher Slobogin et al., A Prevention Model of Juvenile Justice: The Promise of
Kansas v. Hendricks for Children, 1999 Wis. L. Rev. 185.
91 develop these points further in Chapters Two and Six of Minding Justice: Depriv-
ing People with Mental Disability of Life and Liberty (forthcoming 2001). See also
2000] 1201
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Accepting blameworthiness as the touchstone of the criminal
law means that individual culpability must be assessed. That is
where the kind of inquiry the insanity defense mandates comes
into play. It is meant to help us decide who among those who
commit criminal acts deserve to be the subject of criminal punish-
ment.' °
The central assertion of this Article, however, is that the insanity
defense does not adequately carry out this definitional task. At
least in its modem guises, the insanity defense is overbroad. In-
stead, mental disorder should be relevant to criminal culpability
only if it supports an excusing condition that, under the subjective
approach to criminal liability increasingly accepted today, would be
available to a person who is not mentally ill. The three most
prominent such conditions would be: (1) a mistaken belief about
circumstances that, had they occurred as the person believed,
would amount to a legal justification; (2) a mistaken belief that
conditions exist that amount to legally recognized duress; and (3)
the absence of intent to commit crime (that is, the lack of mens rea,
defined subjectively in terms of what the defendant actually knew
or was aware of).
Before justifying this position, some examples of how it would
apply in well-known actual and hypothetical cases should be pro-
vided. As a prime example of the first excusing condition, consider
the famous M'Naghten" case, from whence much of current insan-
ity defense jurisprudence derives. In 1843, Daniel M'Naghten
Hermann, supra note 7, at 93 ("[T]he interest of law and ethics in minimizing socially
harmful conduct is promoted by fostering feelings of responsibility in society."); Paul
H. Robinson, A Failure of Moral Conviction?, 117 Pub. Interest 40, 44 (1994) (stating
that a criminal system that bases punishment on dangerousness "loses its ability to
claim that offenders deserve the sentences they get... [and thus] dilutes its ability to
induce personal shame and to instigate social condemnation").
10 See George P. Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law 835 (1978) ("[T]he issue of in-
sanity requires us to probe our premises for blaming and punishing. In posing the
question whether a particular person is responsible for a criminal act, we are forced to
resolve our doubts about whether anyone is ever responsible for criminal conduct.").
n Daniel M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L. 1843). M'Naghten has been
called the "most significant case in the history of the insanity defense." Donald H.J.
Hermann & Yvonne S. Sor, Convicting or Confining? Alternative Directions in
Insanity Law Reform: Guilty But Mentally Ill Versus New Rules for Release of
Insanity Acquittees, 1983 BYU L. Rev. 499, 508. A good description of the
M'Naghten trial is found in Thomas Maeder, Crime and Madness: The Origins and
Evolution of the Insanity Defense 23-35 (1985).
[Vol. 86:11991202
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killed the secretary of Prime Minister Peel, apparently believing
the secretary was Peel and that killing Peel would bring an end to a
campaign of harassment against him.'2 He was found insane by the
trial court judges. Whether M'Naghten would have been acquitted
under the proposed approach would depend upon whether he be-
lieved the harassment would soon lead to his death or serious
bodily harm and whether he thought there was any other way to
prevent that occurrence. Because in his paranoid state he feared he
would be assassinated by his enemies and had on several occasions
unsuccessfully applied to the police for protection,3 he may have
had such a defense. But if the circumstances in which he thought he
was involved would not amount to self-defense, no acquittal would
result'4 (although a conviction of manslaughter rather than murder
might have been appropriate, analogous to the result under the
modern theory of "imperfect" self-defense as it has developed in
connection with provocation doctrine).
Now consider the case of John Hinckley, who convinced a jury
that he was insane when he tried to kill President Reagan."5 If, as
even his defense attorneys asserted, John Hinckley shot President
Reagan simply because he believed Reagan's death would some-
how unite him with actress Jodi Foster,'6 he would be convicted
under the proposed approach. Regardless of how psychotic Hinck-
ley may have been at the time of the offense, he would not have an
,2 See Maeder, supra note 11, at 27-29.
13 See id. at 28-29.
"Possibly relevant is the fact that M'Naghten was involved in a Scottish group ve-
hemently opposed to Prime Minister Peel's policies. See Daniel N. Robinson, Wild
Beasts and Idle Humours: The Insanity Defense from Antiquity to the Present 163-65
(1996).
15 For a brief account of the Hinckley trial, see Ralph Reisner et al., Law & the
Mental Health System: Civil and Criminal Aspects 538-39 (3d ed. 1999).
16 According to one of the defense experts, on the day of the assassination attempt
Hinckley was "preoccupied with two things: 'the termination of his own existence'
and accomplishing a 'union with Jodie Foster through death, after life."' Id. at 539. In
a letter.to Foster written on the day of the attempt, he stated that in order to win her
respect and love, he was willing to give up his freedom and possibly his life in the per-
petration of what he called a "historic deed." Id. Compare this thought process to that
of Mark David Chapman, who believed that killing John Lennon (a crime for which
he was convicted) would "fill his emptiness" and who told Barbara Walters that
"'[k]illing a celebrity makes you a celebrity."' Ralph Slovenko, Psychiatry and Crimi-
nal Culpability 129-30 (1995) (quoting Mark David Chapman interview by Barbara
Walters, 20/20 (ABC television broadcast, Dec. 4,1992)).
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excuse under the proposed regime, because killing someone to
consummate a love affair is never justified, nor is it deserving even
of a reduction in charge.
Two other recent cases furnish additional exemplars of how the
proposed regime might work in practice. Jeffrey Dahmer killed
and cannibalized thirteen individuals. The jury was right to convict
him.'7 As sick as his actions were, even he never thought they were
justified, and he would not be excused under the proposal. Lorena
Bobbitt, who cut off her husband's penis because he repeatedly
beat her, was found insane. 8 Whether she would have a complete
defense under the proposal would depend on the extent to which
she thought she had other ways of forestalling the beating and
whether the option she chose was disproportionate to that threat.
On the facts presented at trial,'9 even on her own account her act
would probably not be considered necessary by the factfinder, and
she would therefore have been convicted of some version of as-
sault.
In these cases, then, whether a defense existed under the pro-
posed approach would depend upon self-defense principles,
applied to the circumstances as the defendant believed them to be.
A second variety of cases can be analyzed in terms of a similarly
subjectified version of duress, which traditionally has excused
crimes that are coerced by serious threats to harm the perpetrator.
For instance, some people with mental illness who commit crimes
claim they were commanded by God to do so.2" If the perceived
consequences of disobeying the deity were lethal or similarly sig-
17 For descriptions of the Jeffrey Dahmer case and verdict, see Slovenko, supra note
16, at 56-57 (recounting prosecution witness Park Dietz's testimony that Dahmer
killed his victims to ensure that they would stay with him forever and be unable to re-
fuse his demands); Milestones: Found Sane, Time, Feb. 24,1992, at 68.
USee The Unkindest Cut of All: Enough Already, U.S. News & World Rep., Jan.
31, 1994, at 14 (discussing the facts of the Bobbitt case).
,9 According to Ms. Bobbitt, at the time of the assault, she was headed for the
kitchen to get a glass of water, saw a knife, and started thinking of "things about the
abortion. That I am not going to be a good mother... so many things. He torturing
me [sic]. When he was beating me up, when he had forced sex with me." She then
went back to the bedroom, took off the sheets, and cut her husband. The Reuter Li-
brary Report, Sept. 23,1993.
21 See, e.g., McElroy v. State, 242 S.W. 883, 883-84 (Tenn. 1922) (finding that a
defendant who believed his act was commanded by God was sane); State v. Cameron,
674 P.2d 650 (Wash. 1983) (en banc) (finding insanity based on similar facts).
1204 [Vol. 86:1199
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nificant, such a person would deserve acquittal, perhaps even if the
crime charged were homicide. On the other hand, contrary to
Judge Cardozo's famous hypothetical suggestion,2 the mere fact
that the defendant honestly believed God ordained a crime would
not automatically be an excuse.'
The third type of excuse that might apply when people with
mental illness commit crime-lack of mens rea-is extremely rare.
M'Naghten, Hinckley, Dahmer, Bobbitt and Cardozo's hypotheti-
cal defendant all intended to carry out their criminal acts. Indeed,
most people with mental disorder who cause harm mean to do so,
albeit sometimes for reasons that seem irrational. Nonetheless,
when mens rea is defined subjectively, there are at least four possi-
ble lack-of-mens rea scenarios: involuntary action, mistake as to
results, mistake as to circumstances, and ignorance of the law.
First, a person may engage in motor activity without intending it
to occur (for example, a reflex action which results in a gun firing
and killing someone). The criminal law typically classifies such
events as involuntary acts. Although mental disorder usually does
not eliminate conscious control over bodily movements associated
with crime, when it does (for example, in connection with epileptic
seizures), a defense would exist if one accepts the premise that cul-
pability requires intent.'
21 See People v. Schmidt, 110 N.E. 945, 948 (N.Y. 1915) (interpreting M'Naghten to
permit an acquittal for a defendant who claimed to hear the voice of God calling upon
him to kill as a sacrifice and atonement, even though the defendant realized the act
was illegal).
2 A separate ground for excusing such a person might be that he honestly believed
God's command rendered the act legally permissible. This "ignorance of the law" excuse is
discussed more fully below. See infra text accompanying notes 30-31 & 156-61.
23The first three mens rea categories discussed below are meant to relate to the
three actus reus components-conduct, result and circumstance-recognized by the
Model Penal Code. See Model Penal Code § 1.13(9) (1962).
2
4 See, e.g., id. § 2.01 (requiring a "voluntary" act for criminal liability and defining
as involuntary, inter alia, "a reflex or convulsion"; "a bodily movement during uncon-
sciousness or sleep"; and "a bodily movement that otherwise is not a product of the
effort or determination of the actor, either conscious or habitual").
2 The term "automatism" is often used to describe application of the involuntary
act doctrine to those who have mental disorder. See Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W.
Scott, Jr., Criminal Law 405 (3d ed. 1986). Professors LaFave & Scott also note that
although the defense "is sometimes explained on the ground that such a person could
not have the requisite mental state for commission of the crime, the better rationale is
that the individual has not engaged in a voluntary act." Id. Be that as it may, for rea-
2000] 1205
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Second, a person may intentionally engage in conduct but intend
a different result than that which occurs (such as when firing a gun
at a tree kills a person due to a ricochet). Distortions of perception
caused by mental illness might occasionally lead to such accidental
consequences; for instance, a mentally ill person driving a car may
inadvertently hit someone because his "voices" and hallucinations
prevent him from perceiving the relevant sounds and visual cues.
In such situations a subjectively defined mens rea doctrine would
absolve him of criminal liability for any harm caused.
Closely related is the situation in which a person intentionally
engages in conduct and intends the physical result that occurs, but
is under a misapprehension as to the attendant circumstances (such
as when a person intentionally shoots a gun at what he thinks is a
dummy but which in fact is a real person). Of the various mens rea
defenses, mental illness is most likely to play a role here (in what
has sometimes been labeled the "mistake of fact" defense). For in-
stance, a person who believes he is shooting the devil when in fact
he is killing a person,' or a person who exerts control over prop-
erty he delusionally believes to be his, ' would be acquitted of
homicide and theft, respectively, if mens rea is subjectively defined.
Another, more subtle example of this type of mens rea defense is
most likely to arise in connection with a person who is mentally re-
tarded rather than mentally ill. Like a young child, such a person
may kill not realizing that a life has been ended, because of an in-
complete conception of what life is; for instance, the offender may
believe the victim will rejuvenate like a cartoon character.' Mens
rea, subjectively defined, would be absent in such a case because
murder requires not only an intentional killing, but also that the of-
sons of parsimony this Article will continue to include involuntary acts in the lack-of-
mens rea category.
26 See, e.g., Richard J. Bonnie et al., The Case of Joy Baker, in Criminal Law 456,
456-65 (1997).
See, e.g., People v. Wetmore, 583 P.2d 1308, 1310 (Cal. 1978) (allowing the d~fen-
dant to present proof that as a result of mental illness he believed that he owned the
apartment in which he was found and the belongings therein).
21 Or consider the case of John Barclay, who killed a friend for three pounds and a
watch, vaguely knowing it was wrong to do so, but also believing that there was no
difference between killing a human being and killing an ox. See Isaac Ray, A Treatise
on the Medical Jurisprudence of Insanity 92-93 (Winfred Overholser ed., 1962). If
Barclay thought a person and an ox were essentially the same, he may not have had
the mens rea for homicide.
[Vol. 86:11991206
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fender understands that the victim is a human being who is capable
of dying.'
Finally, a person may intentionally engage in conduct and intend
the result, under no misapprehension as to the attendant circum-
stances, but still not intend to commit a crime because of an
inadequate understanding of what crime is. There are actually two
versions of this type of mens rea requirement. First, the person
may not be aware of the concept of crime (as might be true of a
three-year-old). Second, the person may understand that criminal
prohibitions exist but believe that his specific act is legally permis-
sible (such as might occur when a person from a different country
commits an act that would be perfectly legal in his culture, al-
though illegal in ours). The first situation might be called "general"
ignorance of the law, while the second might be called "specific"
ignorance of the law. Outside of the insanity and infancy contexts,
neither type of ignorance has been recognized as an excuse for
mala in se crimes.' However, for reasons discussed in more detail
later in this Article,3' a subjectively defined mens rea doctrine
should excuse at least general ignorance of the law, a position that
would acquit those rare individuals who intentionally carry out
criminal acts without understanding the concepts of good and evil.
In short, the proposal would treat people with mental disorder
no differently from people who are not mentally ill, assuming (and
this is admittedly a big assumption) a modem criminal justice sys-
tem that adopts a subjective approach to culpability. The rest of
this Article will try to justify this proposal. It will do so from three
perspectives: historical, moral, and instrumental. First, as a histori-
cal matter, the insanity defense was the only method of mitigating
culpability for unreasonable actions; now that other aspects of
criminal law doctrine have taken on this role, the defense has lost
much of its raison d'etre. Ironically, the scope of the insanity de-
fense began expanding at roughly the same time developments in
other parts of the criminal law rendered the original defense re-
2Even defendants without mental disorder may have such a defense. See, e.g.,
Keeler v. Superior Court, 470 P.2d 617, 626-30 (Cal. 1970) (reversing a murder con-
viction for killing a fetus, in part because the defendant could not foresee that a fetus
was a person for purposes of the homicide statute).
30 See LaFave & Scott, supra note 25, at 440-44.
It See infra text accompanying notes 156-161.
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dundant in many respects. Second, and most importantly, the pro-
posal captures the universe of mentally disordered individuals who
should be excused. The expansion of the defense that has occurred
in modem times, whether it encompasses anyone with an "abnor-
mal" condition or is limited to those who are viewed as
"irrational," does not adequately distinguish those we excuse from
those we do not. Third, the proposal has several practical advan-
tages, including enhancing respect for people with mental illness,
facilitating treatment, and promoting the legitimacy of the criminal
justice system.
I. THE LESSONS OF HISTORY
The insanity defense has been through several well-known per-
mutations, generally in the direction of expansion. Many of those
who have focused primarily on the insanity defense have not ac-
knowledged the trend toward subjectification of the rest of
criminal law. The intersection of these two trends suggests that the
insanity defense, in its current form, has outlived its usefulness.
A. The Insanity Defense
For most of its existence in Anglo-American law, the "insanity
defense" or its functional equivalent has required gross impair-
ment. Although we have virtually no direct evidence about the
facts of individual cases in medieval and renaissance times,32 com-
mentators of the period consistently spoke of a requirement that
the defendant lack understanding of good and evil or be devoid of
all reason, and often equated the insane with animals or infants.3
12In medieval times, the insanity finding was implemented not through a formal
verdict after judicial instructions, but via pardon from the king. There are several ac-
counts of pardons before the sixteenth century, but the precise grounds for these
actions are not clear. See, e.g., Maeder, supra note 11, at 5 ("There was no need for
tests of exculpatory insanity because the only criteria for a pardon were those dictated
by the king's opinion and conscience.").
Bracton, writing in the thirteenth century, considered insane those who "lack
sense and reason and can no more do wrong or commit a felony than a brute animal."
Hermann, supra note 7, at 23 (quoting Henrici de Bracton, De Legibus et Consuetu-
dinibus Angliae). Coke, writing in the early seventeenth century, held "that one who
is insane does not know what he is doing, lacks the ability of mind and reason, and
therefore cannot possess a felonious intent and purpose." Hermann, supra note 7, at
24. Hale, in the seventeenth century, required the absence of "understanding and
[Vol. 86:11991208
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Thus, using the terminology introduced above, it appears that for
several centuries of English law only mentally ill defendants who
lacked mens rea in the involuntary act, mistake, or general igno-
rance senses were entitled to royal pardon or acquittal.
Beginning no later than the early 1800s, courts in both England
and America increasingly referred to insanity as an inability to dis-
tinguish "right and wrong."' This language could be construed to
mean that a person who intentionally harmed another and was
generally aware of the concept of crime might still be acquitted if,
because of mental disorder, he either did not believe the law pro-
scribed his particular act (that is, the specific ignorance mens rea
test described above) or delusionally perceived facts that
amounted to a justification. In practice, most people tried under
these tests were convicted, irrespective of whether they felt the act
was legally permissible, so long as they intended harm. 5 At the
same time, it is clear that at least some judges and juries prior to
the mid-nineteenth century were willing to relax the legal threshold
for insanity below the medieval devoid-of-reason test. Although
will" akin to the mental state of a youth. Mathew Hale, The History of the Pleas of
the Crown 30 (1736). Blackstone, in the eighteenth century, spoke of "total idiocy, or
absolute insanity" as the gravamen of insanity. 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries
*24-25. Finally, in his famous jury charge, Justice Tracy asked the jury to consider
whether the defendant could "distinguish between good and evil," or instead was "to-
tally deprived of his understanding and memory, and doth not know what he is doing,
no more than an infant, than a brute, or a wild beast." Rex v. Arnold, 16 How. St. Tr.
764-65 (1724).
34 Anthony Platt & Bernard L. Diamond, The Origins of the "Right and Wrong"
Test of Criminal Responsibility and Its Subsequent Development in the United
States: An Historical Survey, 54 Cal. L. Rev. 1227,1250-57 (1966).
-5Illustrative is Maeder's account of the Arnold, Ferrers, Bellingham and Oxford
cases in eighteenth and nineteenth century England, each of which involved defen-
dants with serious mental problems who apparently felt justified in killing their
victims but nonetheless intended to kill them. All except Oxford were convicted. See
Maeder, supra note 11, at 9-22; see also Ray, supra note 28, at 187-88 ("Instead of
inquiring into the effect produced by the peculiar delusions of the accused on his or-
dinary conduct and conversation, and especially of their connexion with the criminal
act in question, the [English] courts in these cases have been contented with laying
down metaphysical dogmas on the consciousness of right and wrong, of good and evil,
and the measure of understanding still possessed by the accused."). In the ten early
nineteenth century American cases involving an insanity plea and a known disposition
that are described by Platt & Diamond, seven resulted in guilty verdicts despite evi-
dence of derangement (and one of the acquittals, Platt & Diamond aver, had more to
do with the elevated social status of the defendant than mental state). See Platt &
Diamond, supra note 34, at 1251-56,1260 tbl.2.
2000] 1209
HeinOnline  -- 86 Va. L. Rev.  1209 2000
Virginia Law Review
the precise grounds for these results are unclear, these cases were
not inconsistent with the notion that a person who, for instance,
knew that he was killing someone might still obtain an insanity
verdict if delusions convinced him his act was justifiable. 6
In any event, the M'Naghten test, promulgated by the House of
Lords in 1843, appeared to recognize both versions of insanity by
excusing those who, by virtue of mental disorder, either did not
know the nature and quality of the act or that it was wrong. 7 The
House of Lords also refined the latter test for those defendants
who were not "totally" insane, but rather experienced their delu-
sions primarily in connection with the offense:
[As to a person who] labours under such partial delusion only,
and is not in other respects insane, we think he must be consid-
ered in the same situation as to responsibility as if the facts with
respect to which the delusion exists were real. For example, if
under the influence of his delusion he supposes another man to
be in the act of attempting to take away his life, and he kills that
man, as he supposes, in self-defence, he would be exempt from
punishment. If his delusion was that the deceased had inflicted
a serious injury to his character and fortune, and he killed him
in revenge for such supposed injury, he would be liable to
punishment."
This language explicitly allows a defense for a person who, regard-
less of his knowledge about the law, erroneously believes he is
confronted by facts that, if true, make his act justifiable.
The next steps in insanity defense jurisprudence responded to
two criticisms leveled at M'Naghten. First, M'Naghten was faulted
because it focused solely on cognitive impairment, thus failing to
36 The two most prominent examples are M'Naghten itself, see supra text accompa-
nying notes 11-14, and Rex v. Hadfield, 27 How. St. Tr. 1281, 1283, 1322, 1323, 1356
(1800) (acquitting a defendant who believed God had told him to sacrifice himself to
save the world and who chose assassination of the King as the best way of assuring his
demise).
The pertinent language from the House of Lords was as follows:
[T]o establish a defence on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved
that, at the time of the committing of the act, the party accused was labouring
under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the
nature and quality of the act he was doing; or, if he did know it, that he did not
know he was doing what was wrong.
M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. at 722.
"IId. at 723.
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recognize volitional impairment.39 A person who knew what he was
doing was wrong, but who felt "compelled" to commit the criminal
act-say, a person suffering from kleptomania or manic-depressive
psychosis-would be criminally punished in a M'Naghten jurisdic-
tion. The second criticism was that, even if restricting the insanity
defense to those who are cognitively impaired is legitimate, the
M'Naghten test did not give the excuse broad enough scope.'
Many severely crazy people knew in some sense the nature of their
act and that it was legally wrong, but either did not internalize or
emotionally relate to the consequences of their act (as might have
occurred in John Hinckley's case), or believed, as in the command-
from-God scenario, that they were morally justified in acting de-
spite the act's "illegality" under the criminal law.
The law eventually responded to both these criticisms. A num-
ber of American jurisdictions added the so-called "irresistible
impulse" test to the M'Naghten test, thereby recognizing volitional
" For a summary of nineteenth century views on this matter, see Parsons v. State, 2
So. 854, 856-57 (Ala. 1887) (citing authorities who argued against cognitive-only tests
and criticizing courts that continued to rely on such tests for "not [keeping] pace with
the progress of thought and discovery in the present advanced stages of medical sci-
ence"). A vigorous pre-M'Naghten critic of cognitive-only tests was Isaac Ray, who
argued that such tests were "fallacious" because a person who "finds himself urged
perhaps to the commission of every outrage, and, though perfectly conscious of what
he is doing, [is] unable to offer the slightest resistance to the overwhelming power that
impels him" is convicted "because no delusion is present to disturb and distort the
mental vision! In short, the very character that renders this mental disorder more ter-
rible than all others is also that which is made to steel the heart against the claims of
humanity in behalf of its miserable victim." Ray, supra note 28, at 42-43. These types
of views continued to be espoused in the twentieth century. See United States v.
Freeman, 357 F.2d 606, 616-18 (2d Cir. 1966) (stating that M'Naghten is based on
outmoded views of the human psyche); Benjamin Cardozo, What Medicine Can Do
for Law, in Law and Literature and Other Essays and Addresses 70, 106, 108 (1931)
(stating that M'Naghten "has little relation to the truths of mental life" and "palters
with reality").
40 Writing in 1943, psychiatrist Gregory Zilboorg argued that if M'Naghten's lan-
guage were taken seriously, it would excuse only those "totally deteriorated, drooling,
hopeless psychotics of long standing, and congenital idiots." Gregory Zilboorg, Mind,
Medicine, and Man 273 (1943); see also S. Sheldon Glueck, Law and Psychiatry: Cold
War or Entente Cordiale? 46 (1962) (calling the test rigid and inflexible); Hermann &
Sor, supra note 11, at 512 (describing views from the 1930s through 1960s that the
"'know' and 'wrong' language was ambiguous, obscure, unintelligible, and too nar-
row").
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impairment as a defense.4' Many jurisdictions also interpreted the
M'Naghten language loosely. Total cognitive impairment was not
required, nor was mere awareness that the act was prohibited by
statute a bar to acquittal; the focus was on whether the accused's
mental disease deprived him of the capacity to recognize the
wrongfulness of the offense in some larger sense.4"
These developments culminated in the test found in the Ameri-
can Law Institute's Model Penal Code. This test reads as follows:
"A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of
such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks sub-
stantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness]
of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the
law."' 3 Note that this language recognizes both cognitive and voli-
tional impairment as an excuse and requires only substantial, not
total, incapacity.'4 It also uses the broader term "appreciate,"
rather than "know," in defining the type of cognitive impairment
that leads to insanity, in an effort to recognize lack of affective, or
emotional, understanding as a defense. Finally, the test provides
the "wrongfulness" option, meant to allow an insanity finding not
only when the person did not know the act was illegal under the
law, but also under circumstances where mental illness led to a be-
lief that the act was morally permissible according to community
standards.'6
41 At its peak in the 1920s, the "irresistible impulse test" formed part of the insanity
defense in seventeen states and the military court system. See Goldstein, supra note 3,
at 241-42 n.1 (1967) (collecting cases). The notion that volitional tests developed after
cognitive ones is the traditional history of the insanity defense. Note, however, that a
number of states developed insanity formulations focusing on lack of volition at virtu-
ally the same time they adopted lack-of-knowledge tests. See Henry Weihofen,
Mental Disorder as a Criminal Defense 100-03 (1954).
42See Goldstein, supra note 3, at 49 ("[M]ost of the courts which have addressed
themselves to the question [of defining "know" in the M'Naghten test] have favored a
rather broad construction.").
43 Model Penal Code § 4.01(1) (1962).
4 The drafters stated, "The adoption of the standard of substantial capacity may
well be the Code's most significant alteration of the prevailing tests." Model Penal
Code and Commentaries § 4.01 cnt. 3, at 172 (Official Draft and Revised Comments
1985) [hereinafter MPC Commentaries].
,5 Id. at 169 ("The use of 'appreciate' rather than 'know' conveys a broader sense of
understanding than simple cognition.").
46 More specifically, "criminality" in the Model Penal Code formulation was meant
to refer to the illegality of the act, whereas "wrongfulness" was meant to refer to a
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Since the early 1950s, when the American Law Institute ("ALI")
test was first promulgated, several other insanity defense formula-
tions have been advanced. The two most expansive were both
proposed in their modem American form by Judge David Bazelon,
one of the giants of mental health law. In Durham v. United
States,'7 he rejuvenated the so-called "product test." Derived from
the writings of the nineteenth-century medical scholar Isaac Ray,'
this test excuses crime simply if it is caused by mental illness, with
no particular proof of cognitive or volitional impairment required.
Several years later, disenchanted with the medical model underly-
ing the insanity defense and with the conclusory expert testimony
the product test produced, Bazelon called for acquittal whenever
the person could not "justly be held responsible" for the criminal
act.49 This test is the most expansive of any of those discussed here,
because it entirely delinks the "insanity" test from any mental dis-
order predicate and thus gives the factfinder free rein to decide
who should be held accountable for criminal acts. Alternatively,
academics from the clinical and legal disciplines, such as Finga-
rette,' Moore,5 Morse, 2 Sendor,53 and Schopp, have proposed
community or personal belief that the act was wrong. See id. Although the drafters
did not believe there were significant differences between the two options, they did
state that a person who acted under a command from God or otherwise thought he
was "morally justified" might more easily be acquitted under the latter formulation.
See id. at 169-70.
- 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir: 1954).
41 In State v. Pike, 49 N.H. 399 (1870), the New Hampshire Supreme Court crafted a
test which stated that "if the [crime] was the offspring or product of mental disease in
the defendant, he was not guilty by reason of insanity." Id. at 442. The writer of this
opinion, Justice Doe, was heavily influenced by Ray's work. See Henry Weihofen,
The Urge to Punish: New Approaches to the Problem of Mental Irresponsibility for
Crime 5 (1956).
41 United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 1032 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Bazelon, C.J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part). See generally David L. Bazelon, The Morality
of the Criminal Law, 49 S. Cal. L. Rev. 385 (1976) (discussing the refinement of his
views from Durham to Brawner).
-1 See Herbert Fingarette & Ann Fingarette Hasse, Mental Disabilities and Criminal
Responsibility 218 (1979) (advocating a defense if the accused lacked "capacity for
rational conduct").
5 See Michael S. Moore, Law and Psychiatry: Rethinking the Relationship 245
(1985) (stating that an excuse exists when the accused is "so irrational as to be nonre-
sponsible") [hereinafter Moore, Law and Psychiatry].
.1 See Stephen J. Morse, Immaturity and Irresponsibility, 88 J. Crim. L. & Criminol-
ogy 15, 24 (1997) ("Rationality... is the most general, important prerequisite to
being morally responsible.").
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tests that focus on the rationality of the defendant, a construct that
is cognitively oriented but which, its proponents claim, also cap-
tures those with volitional impairment who ought to be excused.'
Although the rationality tests vary in form, they all look at the ex-
tent to which the thought content of the criminal defendant reflects
reality and the manner in which the defendant processes informa-
tion.
None of these latter tests have been adopted by any state, and
the product test exists in only one state 6 The ALI test, on the
other hand, proved quite popular, at one time holding sway in vir-
tually all the federal circuits and over half the states (with the rest
using M'Naghten alone or combined with an irresistible impulse
defense).' But after John Hinckley's acquittal on charges of at-
tempting to assassinate President Reagan, the federal government,
as well as several states that had adopted the ALI test, eliminated
the volitional prong and tried to narrow the scope of the defense in
other ways.' Furthermore, at least five states have now eliminated
the insanity defense altogether."
53 See Benjamin B. Sendor, Crime as Communication: An Interpretive Theory of
the Insanity Defense and the Mental Elements of Crime, 74 Geo. L.J. 1371, 1415
(1986) ("Irrationality is a vital aspect of the exculpatory nature of insanity because
rationality is an essential attribute of intelligible conduct, of behavior an observer,
such as a jury, can interpret.").
M See Robert F. Schopp, Automatism, Insanity, and the Psychology of Criminal Re-
sponsibility: A Philosophical Inquiry 215 (1991) ("A person is not responsible for
criminal conduct if he performed that conduct while suffering major distortion of his
cognitive capacities that substantially impaired his ability to decide whether or not to
perform that conduct through the process of practical reasoning that is ordinarily
available to an adult who does not suffer major cognitive disorder.").
5$See, e.g., id. at 203 ("[Mlajor cognitive dysfunction constitutes the type of voli-
tional disorder that gives rise to the NGRI defense."); Morse, supra note 52, at 29-30
("Although the internal hard choice model is plausible... I prefer to analyze these
cases in terms of irrationality.").
New Hampshire retains the product test. See State v. Abbot, 503 A.2d 791 (N.H.
1985).
See 3 Michael L. Perlin, Mental Disability Law: Civil and Criminal § 15.07, at 302
(1989).
'4 See Reisner et al., supra note 15, at 526-27.
59 See supra note 2; see also Pouncey v. State, 465 A.2d 475 (Md. 1983) (seeming to
abolish the insanity defense in Maryland).
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B. Other Defenses
Running parallel to the expansionary developments in insanity
defense jurisprudence through the 1970s were much more signifi-
cant developments (in terms of the number of cases affected)
concerning the mens rea required for specific offenses and the
scope of affirmative defense doctrines such as self-defense, provo-
cation, and duress. These other legal defenses have also, over time,
generally expanded. What is especially important for the purposes
of this Article is a particular sense in which they have expanded:
They have all moved toward a more subjective definition of culpa-
bility that makes evidence of mental disorder relevant
independently of the insanity defense.
In early medieval times, proof of the act alone may have been
sufficient to convict;' neither mens rea nor affirmative defense
doctrine existed in the formal substantive criminal law. Even acci-
dental harm or harm perpetrated in self-defense appears to have
been punished criminally, although perhaps not as severely as in-
tentional unjustified conduct." By the twelfth or thirteenth
centuries, the courts, under the influence of the church, did begin
to speak of an evil or vicious mindset as a predicate for guilt,' but
this requirement was not particularly significant. It appeared to bar
conviction for pure accident and objectively reasonable self-
defense and perhaps for involuntary acts as well. Other than that,
as already noted, noninsane individuals who committed crime-
people who knew their acts were causing harm-were considered
culpable regardless of the degree of purposefulness behind their
conduct or the precise goal of that conduct.'
61 See Francis Bowes Sayre, Mens Rea, 45 Harv. L. Rev. 974, 981 (1932) ("[U]p to
the twelfth century the conception of mens rea in anything like its modem sense was
non-existent.").
11 See id. at 981-82.
62 See Hermann, supra note 7, at 22 (describing movement toward intent as a basis
for liability, prompted by a "study of Roman law and the increased authority of eccle-
siastically trained jurists drawing on canon law and the teachings of the Church
Fathers").
6 As Sayre put it, mens rea in this period "smacked strongly of general moral
blameworthiness." Sayre, supra note 60, at 988. With respect to homicide "[t]he line
between murder and manslaughter was unknown; there was no legal distinction be-
tween voluntary and involuntary homicide." Id. at 994.
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By the fifteenth century, the law regarding mens rea showed
signs of progression toward a more refined subjective approach.
Courts began to differentiate between mental states, so that in the
law of homicide, for instance, those whose acts were malicious and
willful were viewed as more culpable than those who acted less de-
liberately. ' Many crimes were said to require what came to be
called "specific intent" in both England and America,' that is, in-
tent to cause a result beyond that associated with knowingly
engaging in particular conduct. Thus, burglary (defined as entering
a dwelling with an intent to commit theft) was said to require the
specific intent to commit theft.
In theory, a person who, because of mental disorder, did not kill
"willfully" or did not possess the required specific intent should be
acquitted of these types of offenses. In practice, however, the sub-
jectification of mens rea only went so far. Prior to the mid-
twentieth century, evidence of impaired mental state was rarely
considered relevant outside of the insanity context, even in the
relatively more "liberal" United States.' Moreover, even the for-
mal law of mens rea remained predominately objectively defined
with respect to mistakes of fact (for example, mistakes about own-
ership of property, consent, or identity of the victim); 61 as noted
61 See id. at 996. According to Robinson, however, even into the nineteenth century
English courts did not often conduct serious investigations of subjective mental state,
in part because they viewed such determinations to be "beyond the power of juries,"
in part because rules of evidence, such as the prohibition of testimony from the de-
fendant, made such inquiry very difficult, and in part because of allegiance to the
presumption that all persons intend the natural consequences of their acts. Paul H.
Robinson, A Brief History of Distinctions in Criminal Culpability, 31 Hastings L.J.
815, 844-45 (1980).
6See LaFave & Scott, supra note 25, at 237-39 (describing the "traditional view"
with respect to specific and general intent); Sayre, supra note 60, at 999-1003 (discuss-
ing the historical development of the specific intent requirement with respect to
particular crimes).
The Supreme Court's statement in Fisher v. United States, 328 U.S. 463, 476
(1946), that admission of evidence of mental disorder for purposes other than showing
insanity was a "radical departure from common law concepts" may have been some-
what of an overstatement, but not by much. Even as late as the year Fisher was
decided, at most nine states permitted such evidence, and at least two of these did so
only in dictum. See Henry Weihofen & Winfred Overholser, Mental Disorder Affect-
ing the Degree of a Crime, 56 Yale L.J. 959,967 (1947).
67 See Peter W. Low, The Model Penal Code, the Common Law, and Mistakes of
Fact: Recklessness, Negligence, or Strict Liability?, 19 Rutgers L.J. 539, 546 (1988)
(describing the Model Penal Code's subjective approach to mistake of fact as a "re-
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earlier, mental illness is much more likely to lead to such mistakes
than to an inability to form an intent to carry out the conduct or to
cause the particular result associated with the crime.
Other defensive doctrines were even more clearly defined in ob-
jective terms until well into this century. A person was acquitted on
self-defense grounds only if, as an objective matter, the harm he
committed was no greater than the harm prevented.' A person
who asserted provocation could prevail on that claim only if certain
types of provoking events, derived from assumptions about how
reasonable people react, were proven." Duress was available only
in a very limited number of objectively defined circumstances."
Under these defenses, the defendant's assertions about his feelings
at the time of the offense, even if believed, were hardly dispositive,
and often not even deemed relevant. Certainly, evidence of mental
illness was not considered pertinent.7'
Probably the single most important trend in American criminal
law during the twentieth century has been the erosion of this posi-
tion. The leader in this trend toward subjectively defined
culpability, as with the insanity defense, was again the American
Law Institute's Model Penal Code.
ject[ion of] a judgment expressed in a common-law rule that was centuries in its evo-
lution").
63 The "prevailing rule" in the first half of this century was that there be "a reason-
able ground" for the belief that defensive action was necessary. MPC Commentaries,
supra note 44, § 3.04 cmt. 2, at 35 & cases cited in n.3. Even in modem times, the law
in most jurisdictions requires that "the defendant's belief in the necessity of using
force to prevent harm to himself be a reasonable one, so that one who honestly
though unreasonably believes in the necessity of using force in self-protection loses
the defense." LaFave & Scott, supra note 25, at 493-94.
See A.J. Ashworth, The Doctrine of Provocation, 35 Cambridge L.J. 292, 292-93
(1976) (describing the development of provocation doctrine in the seventeenth cen-
tury toward four categories of "legally sufficient" provocation: "(i) angry words
followed by an assault, (ii) the sight of a friend or relative being beaten, (iii) the sight
of a citizen being unlawfully deprived of his liberty, and (iv) the sight of [one's wife
committing adultery]").
70 As with self-defense doctrine, the law of duress in many jurisdictions remains
objectively defined. See LaFave & Scott, supra note 25, at 474 ("The present
law... [requires] that the threat of harm produce in the defendant a reasonable ('well
grounded,' as the cases sometimes say) fear that the harm will be inflicted if the de-
fendant refuses to obey.").
71 For instance, as to provocation, LaFave & Scott state that under the traditional
test "[i]t is quite uniformly held that the defendant's special mental qualities.., are
not to be considered." Id. at 711-12. As to self-defense and duress, see supra notes 68
& 70.
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With respect, first, to mens rea, the Code expresses a strong
preference for criminal liability based on proof of actual awareness
that one is causing the result under the circumstances required for
the crime,' a position that, as discussed above, the common law
never fully embraced. Following logically from this proposition, the
Code permits evidence of mental abnormality to be introduced not
only on the insanity issue, but also on the issue of whether the ac-
cused had the mens rea associated with the crime.73 For instance, to
repeat previous examples, if a person's mental disorder leads him
to kill another accidentally, or to believe that he is shooting the
devil rather than a person, he should be acquitted of both murder
and manslaughter under the Model Penal Code,74 regardless of his
likely success with the insanity defense, because he did not intend
to end the life of a human being, nor was he even aware of the risk
of doing so. (Whether he would be convicted of negligent homicide
is discussed later in this Article.) This idea is often referred to as
the "diminished capacity" defense, but that is a misleading phrase
to the extent it suggests a special defense for those with mental ill-
ness.76 In fact, this provision of the Code is nothing more than a
recognition that mental illness, like inadvertence and incompe-
tence, can negate the requisite mens rea for the crime.
Even more significant is the Model Penal Code's approach to
defensive doctrines such as self-defense, provocation and duress. In
contrast to the common law, the Code permits the defendant as-
serting these defenses to submit evidence about his or her own
7 "It was believed to be unjust to measure liability for serious criminal offenses on
the basis of what the defendant should have believed or what most people would have
intended." MPC Commentaries, supra note 44, § 2.02 cmt. 2, at 235. The Code does
recognize negligence as a sufficient ground for criminal liability in rare instances (in-
cluding homicide, see Model Penal Code § 210.4 (1962)), but the commentaries also
state that negligence "should properly not generally be deemed sufficient in the defi-
nition of specific crimes." MPC Commentaries, supra note 44, § 2.02 cmt. 4, at 243-44.
7 See Model Penal Code § 4.02(1) ("Evidence that the defendant suffered from a
mental disease or defect is admissible whenever it is relevant to prove that the defen-
dant did or did not have a state of mind which is an element of the offense.").
74 Under the Code, murder occurs when a person is killed purposely, knowingly, or
extremely recklessly, and manslaughter occurs when a person is killed recklessly, see
id. §§ 210.2, 210.3, with recklessness requiring an awareness of the risk of death. See
id. § 2.02(2)(c).
75 See infra text accompanying notes 149-155.
76 See Criminal Justice Mental Health Standards, supra note 3, at 352-53.
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feelings and thoughts at the time of the offense. For instance, in the
justification domain the Code permits the use of deadly force
whenever "the actor believes such force is necessary to protect him-
self against death, serious bodily harm, kidnapping or sexual
intercourse compelled by force or threat."' This formulation
makes the actor's beliefs relevant to, although not dispositive of, a
self-defense claim. As such, the defense is not a justification, in the
sense of acquitting a person whose acts we condone or perhaps
even encourage, but rather is an excuse, because it permits acquit-
tal given the kind of person the defendant is." One might also call
the Model Penal Code's approach "subjective justification" be-
cause, although the ultimate judgment as to whether the person's
actions were justified depends upon an objective balancing of the
harm caused against the harm prevented, the harms to be balanced
are determined by the subjective perceptions of the actor, not
those of the outside world.
The provision of the Code that is analogous to the common law
provocation doctrine is somewhat more objectively defined but still
incorporates subjective elements. It states that a homicide which
would otherwise be murder is manslaugher if it is "committed un-
der the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance for
which there is reasonable explanation or excuse,... [t]he reason-
ableness of such explanation or excuse [to] be determined from the
viewpoint of a person in the actor's situation under the circum-
stances as he believes them to be."79 Similarly, with respect to duress,
the Code provides for an affirmative defense when a person com-
mits a crime "because he was coerced to do so by the use of, or a
threat to use, unlawful force against his person or the person of an-
other, which a person of reasonable firmness in his situation would
have been unable to resist."' The commentary to the Code makes
clear that the intent of this latter provision "is to give effect to the
' Model Penal Code § 3.04(2)(b) (emphasis added).
7 On the difference between excuse and justification, see Joshua Dressier, Justifica-
tions and Excuses: A Brief Review of the Concepts and the Literature, 33 Wayne L.
Rev. 1155, 1163-66 (1987).
79 Model Penal Code § 210.3(1)(b) (emphasis added).
,a Id. § 2.09(1) (emphasis added).
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defense when an actor mistakenly believes that a threat to use
unlawful force has been made."8
Theoretically, therefore, evidence of mental abnormality could
be relevant under any of these affirmative defenses.' As with the
insanity defense, many states have refused to follow the Model Pe-
nal Code's lead in defining the lack of mens rea and affirmative
defenses. But, in large part due to the impetus provided by the
Code, the subjective approach to criminal culpability is now well
entrenched in criminal justice jurisprudence.
C. Implications
From this brief overview, two facts should be clear. First, the in-
sanity defense developed at a time when no other culpability
doctrine mitigated punishment for nonaccidental crime. Even in
relatively recent times, insanity was the only possible defense for a
mentally ill person who acted "unreasonably" in committing an of-
fense. For such persons, there was no mens rea, provocation, or
subjective justification plea.
Second, in a sizeable number of jurisdictions today, anyone-
mentally ill or not-whose actions are involuntary, who makes a
mistake as to result or fact, or who believes he is confronted by cir-
cumstances that would lead to justification, provocation, or duress,
may have a defense. Thus, the universe of excuses has expanded to
the point where many of those who would be acquitted under an
insanity defense could also succeed under another doctrine. For
example, a criminal defendant who didn't know the nature and
quality of the act will usually lack mens rea if the latter is subjec-
tively defined, while a person who didn't think the act was wrong
will often also have a subjective justification. Although the subjec-
tification trend pioneered by the Model Penal Code "has its
detractors,' it has also been vigorously defended,' and the rest of
"MPC Commentaries, supra note 44, § 2.09 cmt. 3, at 380.
The major caveat to this view of the Model Penal Code is that when negligence is
grounds for criminal liability, as it is for negligent homicide under the Code, see
Model Penal Code § 210.4, then a negligent mistake as to the elements of self-defense
or duress also leads to liability. See id. § 3.09(2). However, under the Code, even neg-
ligence is defined relatively subjectively. More is said about negligence as a basis for
liability below. See infra text accompanying notes 149-55.
81 The most famous detractor is Justice Holmes, who argued that
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this Article will be premised on the assumption, without further
discussion, that it represents the morally appropriate view.'
One could conclude from all of this that the insanity defense is
no longer needed. If, as this Article eventually proposes,' general
ignorance of the law is added to the list of excuses recognized in
the Model Penal Code, the subjectively defined defensive doctrines
provide a broader basis for exculpation than both the pre-
M'Naghten formulations of the defense and the M'Naghten test it-
self (at least if literally interpreted). Thus, if the latter formulation
is morally sufficient for purposes of recognizing the exculpatory ef-
fect of mental disorder, the proposal advanced in this Article
should be as well.
Some defendants who might be acquitted under more modem
versions of the insanity defense, however, clearly would not be un-
der these other defensive doctrines. As illustrated at the beginning
of this Article, for instance, those whose beliefs, if true, would not
affiount to justification would not be acquitted under any of the sub-
jectified defenses; an insanity defense under the ALI or Bazelon
tests would provide the only hope of avoiding conviction in such
situations. Similarly, those who exhibit only volitional impairment
when we are dealing with that part of the law which aims more directly than any
other at establishing standards of conduct, we should expect there more than
elsewhere to find that the tests of liability are external, and independent of the
degree of evil in the particular person's motives or intentions.... [These
standards] take no account of incapacities, unless the weakness is so marked as
to fall into well-known exceptions, such as infancy or madness.
Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., The Common Law 43 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., Little,
Brown and Co. 1963) (1881). It also appears that the subjective view of culpability is
not constitutionally required, at least under some circumstances. See Montana v.
Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 51 (1996) (holding that due process is not violated by a statute
which prohibits introduction of evidence showing that substance abuse negates the
mens rea for the crime, largely because the intoxication defense is of "recent vintage,"
a description that would apply to all the subjective defensive doctrines discussed here
except the insanity defense).
84 See, e.g., Jerome Hall, Negligent Behavior Should be Excluded from Penal Liabil-
ity, 63 Colum. L. Rev. 632 (1963); Glanville Williams, Section 3.09 Comment,
Tentative Draft 8, Model Penal Code at 79-80 (1958), cited in MPC Commentaries,
supra note 44, § 3.09 cmt. 2, at 152-53 n.10 (arguing for a subjective approach to the
affirmative defenses).
1 If one accepts this position, the mens rea alternative endorsed by many enemies of
the insanity defense, see supra note 2, clearly fails because it does not recognize sub-
jective justification for those with mental illness. We can hardly deny a defense to
those with mental illness that we freely grant to others.
1 See infra text accompanying note 157.
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would generally have a defense only under the volitional prong of
the insanity test that is still recognized in some jurisdictions. The
question thus becomes whether there are normative reasons for
recognizing a separate, special defense in such situations.
II. MORAL CONSIDERATIONS
Current insanity tests are overbroad because, if taken literally,
they move too far toward the deterministic reductio ad absurdum
that no one is responsible. The irrationality test favored by a num-
ber of scholars begins to deal with the problem, because it focuses
on a person's reasons for committing crime as the dispositive cause
of criminal behavior. But it too is overbroad, because it fails to ex-
plain why irrational reasons are necessarily exculpatory. Allowing
subjectively defined defensive doctrines to do the work better cap-
tures the universe of people who should be excused.
A. The Assault of Determinism
The development of the modem behavioral sciences has made
the criminal law's attempt to draw a coherent line between responsi-
bility and nonresponsibility ever more difficult. The claim embodied
in the insanity defense, regardless of the specific language used, is
that symptoms of mental illness over which the defendant had little
or no control caused the crime. As long as mental disorder is kept
narrowly defined, as was the case before the advent of modem
psychiatry, this type of claim is not particularly threatening to the
legal system and a culture which treasures a belief in autonomy.
But when mental health professionals tell us that we have as little
control over aspects of "character" as we do over mental illness,
when science begins establishing clear correlates between physiol-
ogy and aggression, and when the medical model of mental disease
is supplemented with other, more exogenous models of disorder,
determinism's assault on the citadel of free will begins to carry the
day.
Consider first the number of mental impairments that fall under
the rubric of "character" deficiencies, as distinguished from the
psychotic dysfunctions such as schizophrenia (characterized by de-
lusions and hallucinations) and the bipolar disorders (characterized
by mania) that have traditionally formed the basis for the insanity
1222 [Vol. 86:1199
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defense. The official diagnostic manual of the American Psychiat-
ric Association includes a plethora of disorders that fit in this
category, including mental retardation, many types of impulse dis-
orders (such as pedophilia), and an even larger number of so-called
"personality disorders" (such as schizoid personality, borderline
personality, dependent personality, paranoid personality, and anti-
social personality).' All of these disorders are thought to be
congenital or at least produced by early childhood influences, and
many of them are even more immune to change than the psycho-
ses.' At any given time in the United States, perhaps 10% of the
general population,' and well over 40% of the prison population,
suffers from one of these nonpsychotic disorders.' All by them-
selves, people diagnosed as psychopaths, a well-studied subcategory
of antisocial personality disorder, comprise perhaps 20% of those
in prison.9'
Then there are numerous studies showing correlations between
antisocial behavior and genetic makeup (for example, an extra Y
chromosome), hormonal imbalances, abnormal EEGs, certain de-
8See American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Men-
tal Disorders 13-24 (4th ed. 1994) (listing disorders) [hereinafter DSM-IV].
See, e.g., American Psychiatric Glossary 153 (7th ed. 1994) (defining "personality
disorder" as "[e]nduring patterns of perceiving, relating to, and thinking about the
environment and oneself that begin by early childhood and are exhibited in a wide
range of important social and personal contexts. These patterns are inflexible and
maladaptive, causing either significant functional impairment or subjective distress").
89 See Lee N. Robins et al., Antisocial Personality, in Psychiatric Disorders in Amer-
ica: The Epidemiological Catchment Area Study 258, 273 (L.N. Robins & D. Reiger
eds., 1991); Myrna M. Weissman, The Epidemiology of Personality Disorders: A 1990
Update, 7 J. Personality Disorders 44, 50 tbl. 3 (1993) (showing data from four studies
finding between 10% and 13% prevalence rate of Axis II disorders).
In 1985, for instance, it was estimated that roughly 35% of the prison population
suffered from character disorders, and another 9.5% to 29% were suffering from re-
tardation. See Samuel Jan Brakel et al., The Mentally Disabled and the Law 736-37
(1985). A number of studies indicate that the prevalence of antisocial personality dis-
order, stringently defined, is almost 40% among prison populations. See, e.g. Robert
D. Hare, Diagnosis of Antisocial Personality Disorder in Two Prison Populations, 140
Am. J. Psychiatry 887, 888 (1983) (reporting 39% prevalence using criteria more re-
strictive than those found in DSM-III); Robins et al., supra note 89, at 274.
91 See Stephen D. Hart & Robert D. Hare, Psychopathy: Assessment and Associa-
tion with Criminal Conduct, in Handbook of Antisocial Behavior 22,24 (E.M. Stoff et
al. eds., 1997) (finding that between 15% and 30% of offenders and forensic patients
meet strict criteria for psychopathy); Mary K. Feeney, Why They Kill: Psychopaths
Have No Feelings for Their Victims-or Anyone, Hartford Courant, Oct. 21, 1997, at
Fl (reporting estimates that one in five prison inmates are psychopaths).
2000] 1223
HeinOnline  -- 86 Va. L. Rev.  1223 2000
Virginia Law Review
ficiencies in intellectual capacities, and various types of brain dys-
functions.' Although many of these studies are inconclusive, or are
contradicted by other studies,' it is clear that some biological fac-
tors do strongly predispose people to commit crime.' The number
of people afflicted by such physiological problems is substantial.'
Finally, there are mental impairments that are more clearly
caused by external factors, such as bad relationships, trauma, and
general stress. The "battered woman syndrome" and "Vietnam
veteran syndrome" (both based on the official diagnosis of post-
traumatic stress disorder6), "black rage," and the "abuse excuse"
are among the many legal creations meant to capture this notion.'
Given their vague contours, the prevalence of such phenomena is
hard to estimate, but it is not insubstantial."
These various psychological insights pose a potentially signifi-
cant problem for the law of insanity as currently structured,
because a vast number of people who commit crime can now make
a plausible claim that they were significantly impaired by a "mental
disorder" at the time of the offense. Although courts for the most
part have rejected exculpatory claims based on nonpsychotic dis-
9 See Deborah W. Denno, Human Biology and Criminal Responsibility: Free Will
or Free Ride?, 137 U. Pa. L. Rev. 615, 619-45 (1988) (summarizing studies).
9 See id.
1, See Aggression and Violence: Genetic, Neurobiological, and Biosocial Perspec-
tives (David M. Stoff & Robert B. Cairnes eds., 1996) (summarizing studies on
correlations between aggressive behavior and family and genetic epidemiology, neu-
rotransmitter and temporal lobe deficiencies, serotonin levels, autonomic reactivity,
and so on); Adrian Raine, The Psychopathology of Crime: Criminal Behavior as a
Clinical Disorder 79 (1993) ("A very tentative and global estimate for the extent of
heritability for crime is that genetic influences account for about half the variance in
criminal behavior.").
"See, e.g., Raine, supra note 94, at 90-91 (reviewing studies showing a correlation
between aggressive offenders and low serotonin levels, with the percentage of such
offenders ranging from 20% to 50%, depending upon the study).
9See DSM-IV, supra note 87, at 427-28 (discussing post-traumatic stress disorder
("PSTD")); id. at 424 (noting that "military combat" and "violent personal assault"
can produce the trauma leading to PTSD).
See Christopher Slobogin, Psychiatric Evidence in Criminal Trials: To Junk or
Not to Junk?, 40 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1, 5-12 (1998) (describing various new psychi-
atric defenses).
8For example, DSM-IV reports studies indicating that the prevalence of post-
traumatic stress disorder in the general population is 1% to 14%. See DSM-IV, supra
note 87, at 426.
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orders,' it is not clear how this stance is justified under the more
modem official insanity tests." For instance, if the law wishes to
inquire into whether defendants affectively understand their crime,
as the ALI formulation purportedly does, psychopaths should be
prime candidates for an insanity defense; their emotional capacity
is far less substantial than many of those who suffer from schizo-
phrenia."' Because of their frequent difficulty in understanding the
full consequences of their actions, people with mild and moderate
mental retardation should also be eligible for the defense in its
cognitive version." If the ALI's second prong, calling for an as-
sessment of volitional impairment, is taken seriously, serial rapists,
pedophiles and exhibitionists should have viable claims; from what
we can tell, the subjectively felt urges of these individuals are at
least equal to the impulses experienced by people with manic-
depressive illness and other psychoses." The same can probably be
19 See Gary Melton et al., Psychological Evaluations for the Courts 217 (2d ed. 1997)
(summarizing six studies showing that the proportion of those found insane who were
diagnosed with a "major psychosis" ranged from 67% to 97%).
,co Professor Goldstein observed that, under the product test in the District of Co-
lumbia, "The psychopath, the neurotic, the narcotics addict, the 'emotionally unstable
personality' have all been held to qualify for the defense, provided a psychiatrist is
willing to testify that the condition in question is a 'mental disease."' Goldstein, supra
note 3, at 214.
0'See Robert D. Hare, Without Conscience: The Disturbing World of the Psycho-
paths Among Us 34,44 (1993) (reporting that psychopaths, inter alia, seem "unable to
'get into the skin' or to 'walk in the shoes' of others, except in a purely intellectual
sense"; are glib and superficial, lack remorse or guilt, lack empathy, have shallow
emotions, and lack responsibility); see also United States v. Currens, 290 F.2d 751,762
(3d Cir. 1961) (refusing to hold that psychopaths are always criminally responsible, in
part based on evidence that they have "lost contact with the deeper emotional ac-
companiments of experience").
-See C. Benjamin Crisman & Rockne J. Chickinell, The Mentally Retarded Of-
fender in Omaha-Douglas County, 8 Creighton L. Rev. 622, 646 (1975) (arguing that,
although mentally retarded persons "may be able to distinguish right from wrong in
the abstract," they have difficulty "applying the abstract concepts to specific factual
settings").
'3 As will be emphasized later in this Article, measuring degrees of volitional im-
pairment is impossible. See infra text accompanying notes 132-45. However, plenty of
evidence supports the intuition that some types of sex offenders experience very pow-
erful urges. See DSM-IV, supra note 87, at 522 (describing "essential features of a
Paraphilia" as "recurrent, intense sexually arousing fantasies, sexual urges, or behav-
iors"); see also Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 354-55 (1997) (describing
Hendricks, "a sexually violent predator," as saying that "he 'can't control the urge' to
molest children" and that "the only sure way he could keep from sexually abusing
children in the future was 'to die"').
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said of people with other types of nonpsychotic disorders such as
borderline personality disorder and attention deficit disorder," as
well as at least some of those influenced by genetic and environ-
mental factors."
Indeed, in theory, a whole host of non-"mentally ill" criminal ac-
tors could qualify under these modem tests, at least to the same
extent as those who are afflicted with psychosis can. For instance,
those individuals who commit crime after being provoked or while
otherwise experiencing a fit of temper may fail the cognitive prong
of insanity because, at the precise time of the offense, they do not
"know," much less "appreciate," the consequences or wrongfulness
of their acts (thus the phrase, "blind rage"). Similarly, it is hard to
say that the very greedy person who takes money he sees lying on
the street is better able "to conform his behavior to the require-
ments of the law" than the insane person who commits a crime."°
To these observations one might reply that the real justification
for ignoring insanity pleas in such cases is that the personality dis-
orders and like conditions do not fit the legal definition of "mental
104 See DSM-IV, supra note 87, at 654 (listing one criterion for borderline personal-
ity disorder as "inappropriate, intense anger or difficulty controlling anger"); id. at 84
(listing one criterion of attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder as "often 'on the go' or
often acts as if 'driven by a motor"').
105 With respect to genetics, see Laura Reider, Toward a New Test for the Insanity
Defense: Incorporating the Discoveries of Neuroscience into Moral and Legal Theo-
ries, 46 UCLA L. Rev. 289, 325 (1998) (concluding, after surveying the neuroscientific
literature, that "the so-called irresistible impulse is perhaps less psychological in ori-
gin than physiological"). With respect to environmental influences, see Patricia J.
Falk, Novel Theories of Criminal Defense Based Upon the Toxicity of the Social En-
vironment: Urban Psychosis, Television Intoxication and Black Rage, 74 N.C. L. Rev.
731, 787-88 & n.303 (1996) (arguing that there is no "doctrinal obstacle" to finding
several of ten defendants who alleged urban psychosis, television intoxication, and
black rage insane under the volitional prong). See also Philip Q. Roche, The Criminal
Mind 191-92 (1958) (asserting that a number of crimes, including kleptomania, fire
setting, and some homicides, are the result of strong urges spurred by an unconscious
desire to resolve profound emotional conflicts).
106 This example comes from Michael Moore. See Michael Moore, Placing Blame: A
General Theory of the Criminal Law 511 (1997) [hereinafter Moore, Placing Blame].
Indeed, if one believes the hard determinists, everyone who commits a crime could be
said to be "substantially unable" to conform, because of factors such as genetic
makeup and environmental influences over which they have little or no control. See
id. at 504 ("If one accepts determinism-the doctrine that every event, including hu-
man actions and willings, has a cause-then it is hard to see why everyone is not
excused for all actions.").
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disease or defect," the typical predicate for the insanity defense.'
But this explanation, standing alone, is simple question-begging.
Unless one can point to some functional difference between the
psychotic and nonpsychotic disorders, the nosological label is ir-
relevant as a normative matter.
B. The Rationality Test
This is where the rationality formulation endorsed by a number
of commentators comes to the rescue, or at least appears to come
to the rescue. Although no jurisdiction has adopted it, the rational-
ity test justifies, better than either the "appreciation" or "lack of
control" test, a threshold for insanity that puts the psychoses on
one side and most other disorders and mental phenomena on the
other. A person with psychosis is often demonstrably irrational, in
the sense that he has fixed, false beliefs and significantly impaired
thought processes. People with personality disorders and purely
volitional impairments, on the other hand, generally have no such
impairment.
Furthermore, by focusing on one's reasons for acting rather than
on emotional appreciation or control of conduct, the proponents of
the rationality test have provided a plausible response to the de-
terminist claim that we are not responsible for any of our behavior
because all behavior is the result of factors over which we have no
control. Michael Moore, one of the first proponents of this test,lu,
assumes that all behavior is caused by biological, characterological,
unconscious, or environmental factors."l But, he argues, none of
those causes necessarily disrupt one's ability to generate reasons
for one's actions, based on one's desires and beliefs. These reasons,
Moore demonstrates, are also causes of behavior, even if they
"' A typical statement in this regard is that iriesistible impulse "is to be distin-
guished from mere passion or overwhelming emotion not growing out of, and
connected with, a disease of the mind. Frenzy arising solely from the passion of anger
and jealousy, regardless of how furious, is not insanity." Thompson v. Common-
wealth, 70 S.E.2d 284,291-92 (Va. 1952).
10 Moore first broached this analysis in book form in Law and Psychiatry, supra
note 51, and recently refined his views in Placing Blame, supra note 106.
"' See Moore, Law and Psychiatry, supra note 51, at 33 ("My own determinist and
mechanist assumptions are that human behavior is fully determined by mechanistic
kinds of happenings in the human body.").
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themselves are caused by biological or other factors.11° Thus, when
a person acts for reasons, he is, so to speak, the "proximate" cause
of his actions and generally should be held responsible for them
(unless the reasons are irrational)."'
Stephen Morse bolsters these arguments with observations
about the incoherence of the traditional volitional impairment in-
quiry" Aside from reflex events, all people, no matter how
compelled they feel, have choices at the time they act.13 When the
pressure to act is external, as when someone puts a gun to an-
other's head and orders that a crime be committed, an excuse may
make normative sense." But Morse suggests that when the pres-
sure to act is internal, as might be the case with a drug addict or
pedophile, a separate volitional excuse generally cannot be sus-
tained for practical and conceptual reasons. First, "it will often be
too difficult to assess the degree of threatened dysphoria that cre-
ates the hard choice."'1 5 As Morse has said elsewhere, "There is no
scientific measure of the strength of urges.""6 Second, "it is simply
not clear that the fear of dysphoria would ever be sufficient to ex-
cuse the breach of important expectations, except in precisely
those cases in which we would assume naturally that the agent's ra-
tional capacity was essentially disabled. '1 7 For example, Morse
says, the "policeman at the elbow" test, which limits the volitional
prong of the insanity defense to situations in which the urge to
commit crime is so strong that not even the presence of a law en-
forcement official disinhibits the person, "is... better interpreted
1"0 See id. at 9-43.
" See id. at 190-245. For a more detailed summary of Moore's reasoning in this re-
gard, see Christopher Slobogin, A Rational Approach to Responsibility, 83 Mich. L.
Rev. 820,822-27 (1985).
112 Morse's arguments appear in several fora. His most elaborate exegesis on the
point in the text is Culpability and Control, 142 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1587 (1994) [hereinaf-
ter Morse, Culpability and Control], but this brief summary will come from several of
his works.
3 See id. at 1590-605.
114 See id. at 1616-19.
I's Morse, supra note 52, at 30.
16 Stephen J. Morse, Crazy Behavior, Morals, and Science: An Analysis of Mental
Health Law, 51 S. Cal. L. Rev. 527,584 (1978).
117 Morse, supra note 52, at 30.
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as a rationality test."1 ' In sum, for Morse, irrationality defines the
scope of excuse produced by internal, psychological causes."9
Moore, Morse and like-minded commentators make a solid ar-
gument against the contention that determinism defeats the law's
effort to attribute culpability, as well as a convincing case for look-
ing at a person's reasons for acting in deciding when culpability
should be imposed. Where they are not as convincing is in explain-
ing why irrational reasons are an automatic basis for exculpation.
Moore's explanation for that position is as follows:
Only if we can see another being as one who acts to achieve
some rational end in light of some rational beliefs will we un-
derstand him in the same fundamental way that we understand
ourselves and our fellow persons in everyday life. We regard as
moral agents only those beings we can understand in this way.Y°
Morse offers a somewhat different rationale: Irrationality is the
preeminent excusing condition because, in his words, it will "make
it too hard" for a person "to grasp or to be guided by the good rea-
sons not to offend.''2
1,8 Stephen J. Morse, Causation, Compulsion and Involuntariness, 22 Bull. Am.
Acad. Psychiatry L. 159,179 (1994).
9 See, e.g., Morse, supra note 52, at 29-30 ("Although the internal hard choice
model is plausible and competing explanations that rely on so-called volitional prob-
lems are confused or lack empirical support, I prefer to analyze these cases in terms of
irrationality."). Other advocates of the irrationality test make similar arguments.
Herbert Fingarette rejects volitional tests of insanity because, regardless of how im-
paired a person is, it is still "the person himself who initiates and carries out the deed,
it is his desire, his mood, his passion, his belief which is at issue, and it is he who acts
to satisfy this desire, or to express this mood, emotion, or belief of his." Herbert Fin-
garette, The Meaning of Criminal Insanity 162 (1972). To Fingarette, what
distinguishes nonresponsible from responsible people is not lack of volition, but "the
way in which [the nonresponsible come] to adopt one or another course of action"-
the fact that they do so irrationally. Id. at 172. Robert Schopp likewise contends that
the only appropriate conception of volitional impairment is one that focuses on
whether there is "some disorder of the capacities by which one engages in conscious
and intentional action in response to deliberation and choice." Schopp, supra note 54,
at 202.
120 Moore, Law and Psychiatry, supra note 51, at 244-45. Moore repeats this expla-
nation almost verbatim in his later book, Placing Blame, supra note 106, at 608.
12 Morse, supra note 52, at 30. As noted earlier, see supra note 119, Morse believes
that hard choice produced by internal conditions is, in theory, a second excusing con-
dition, but he eventually collapses this excuse into the irrationality excuse.
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One can concede Moore's point that we view irrational people
differently without being forced to reach the conclusion that they
thereby deserve exculpation from criminal offenses they commit.
In fact, his explanation is tautological on the question of who
should be considered responsible; it simply declares that irrational
persons are not "moral agents."" To bolster his point, he notes the
medieval tendency to equate mentally disordered persons with
beasts and infants, whom he says we do not regard as moral be-
ings.l" But that equation applies only in those cases in which the
medieval cases applied it: when the offender did not know the na-
ture and quality of the act (and thus lacked the capacity to form
intent, or at least was ignorant of the law in the general sense).
People who know they are harming another cannot so easily be
consigned to the "nonhuman" category, assuming such a category
should exist in the first place.
Morse provides a more cogent reason for using rationality as a
test, but in doing so engages in the same reasoning he criticizes in
those who support the volitionality inquiry. How do we know
when, to use Morse's language, it is "too hard.., to grasp or to be
guided by good reasons not to offend"? 4 The assumption that irra-
tional individuals find it more difficult to obtain or process
information than do other people sounds remarkably like the
proposition, rejected by Morse, that mentally ill people find it
more difficult to control their behavior than do other people.'"
0
'22 Moore also equates a lack of responsibility with the inability to engage in practi-
cal reasoning, see Moore, Law and Psychiatry, supra note 51, at 198-210, but he
defines this inability in terms of irrationality, see id. at 105, and thus the tautology
stands. Robert Schopp makes the same initial move, see Schopp, supra note 54, at
190, but explains defective practical reasoning more in terms of thought process than
content. Schopp's analysis is described in more detail below. See infra notes 126-30
and accompanying text.
12 See Moore, Placing Blame, supra note 106, at 609 ("Thus, it is easy to understand
the historical tendency to analogize the mentally ill to infants and wild beasts.").
124 Morse, supra note 52, at 30 (emphasis added).
12, See Morse, Culpability and Control, supra note 112, at 1631 ("There is simply no
scientific or clinical evidence that 'abnormal' desires are necessarily stronger than
'normal' desires and thus that abnormal desires uniquely threaten unbearable dys-
phoria and produce a consequently harder choice."). In a personal communication,
Morse stated that "[tihe notion of hardness I am using in thinking about responsibility
is not a matter of mechanism, physics or irresistible forces. It is a question of the gen-
eral capacity a person has for rational practical reasoning." E-mail from Stephen
Morse to author (Feb. 7, 2000) (on file with author). The following pages of this Arti-
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Although Morse does not go into detail as to why irrationality
makes access to good reasons difficult, Robert Schopp, another ad-
vocate of a rationality-type test, provides a good description of the
effects of psychopathology on one's practical reasoning abilities."
He notes that people with a major mental disorder such as schizo-
phrenia can experience disturbances in three areas: cognitive focus,
reasoning, and concept formation. With respect to cognitive focus,
people with schizophrenia often have difficulty attending to essen-
tial information and become distracted by irrelevant stimuli; for
instance, they may engage in "perseveration" (repeating references
that are no longer relevant) or experience "thought blocking"
(which involves a complete halt to thinking). Their reasoning abil-
ity is disturbed by the tendency to overgeneralize (by drawing
conclusions without evidence or attributing elaborate meaning to
something) and to engage in combinative thinking (for example,
condensation of impressions into beliefs that are completely unre-
alistic). Finally, they have difficulty forming abstract concepts
correctly, often by including information in categories to which
they bear virtually no relationship.
Schopp illustrates many of these various disturbances in thought
process with the story of Mary."z Mary stabbed to death a woman
she had never met, as the woman came out of a church. Mary ex-
plained that she "had to" commit the crime because some "bad
criminals" were going to kill her unless she convinced them that
she too was bad. She knew of this threat because she had heard
"them" talking about her on the phone (as she walked under the
telephone wires), and because some people, whom she took to be
the bad people, had been watching her on the subway. She chose
the woman as her victim because a man she had thought about kill-
ing earlier "was too strong," because she realized she was
"supposed to" pick someone from a church after she found a dollar
bill with "In God We Trust" on it, and because the woman had
come out of the church just when Mary got there, "so I knew God
wanted me to pick her." Asked whether she was still being watched
cle argue that an offender who lacks a "general capacity for rational practical reason-
ing" does not necessarily find it harder to access the right reasons for acting than
many offenders who have such a capacity.
6 See Schopp, supra note 54, at 185-87.
- See id. at 160-62. The quotations in this paragraph come from these pages.
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at the time of the interview, she answered: "Yes, but now they
think I'm bad like them-but I'm good-I fooled them." She
blamed the act on her "delusions" and insisted the crime "wasn't
my fault."
To Schopp, Mary demonstrated overgeneralized thinking when
she concluded that people looking at her in the subway were
"watching" her, and poor abstraction ability when she interpreted
the words "In God We Trust" as a symbolic message." Her rea-
sons for stabbing the victim-in particular, the glances of the
subway passengers, the dollar bill motto, and the fact that the
woman was leaving the church when she arrived-illustrated atten-
tion to irrelevant details and unwarranted interpretations. She also
held flatly inconsistent beliefs, according to Schopp; for instance,
.she believed that criminals are bad but did not wonder how she
could stab someone and remain good. 9 As Schopp says, these
types of perceptions and thoughts
are.not mere mistakes about the environment. They occur as
part of a pattern of pathological cognitive functioning in which
the person's distorted cognitive processes allow him to accept
these perceptual and cognitive distortions as accurate represen-
tations of the world and to interpret his other experiences in
light of them.'"
Thus, Schopp concludes, people like Mary "lack the capacity to
generate action-plans through the normal process of practical in-
ference...'
Clearly, Mary's cognitive focus, reasoning and concept forma-
tion capacities are severely disturbed, much more so than those of
someone who is not mentally ill. The key question, however, is
whether this disturbance prevented her from assessing the good
reasons for not killing, or at least made it relatively more difficult
for her to access them. In this case, the principal reason for not
committing the criminal act is that it is wrong to kill an innocent
person. Although we have no direct information on this point, it is
I See id. at 186-87.
129 See id. at 195-96. Actually, as argued below, these beliefs are not necessarily in-
consistent; for instance, she could have believed the stabbing was justified.
130 Id. at 197.
3 Id. at 198.
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improbable that this thought never occurred to Mary; despite her
many inaccurate perceptions about the world, she knew the victim
had not tried to harm her and insisted that the crime was not her
"fault" after it occurred, suggesting a sense of guilt. Let us assume,
however, that she did not, at the time of the act, consider the pos-
sible reasons the killing was the wrong thing to do, perhaps
because, given the dollar motto and the serendipity of the woman's
egress from the church, she felt God was directing her. The crucial
empirical question that must be answered is whether, to para-
phrase a well-known expression used in the irresistible impulse
context," this lack of consideration was because she couldn't en-
gage in such consideration at the time of the act or she just didn't
do so. That question is not answerable.'
It is also worth comparing Mary to people in similar situations
who are not severely disordered. For instance, how is Mary differ-
ent, in terms of coming up with reasons for not killing and giving
those reasons their due, from a would-be gang member who is told
his life will end unless he kills someone as part of a gang initiation?
Or from a woman with a dependent personality who kills at the di-
rection of a dominant other?M The youth and the dependent
woman are presumably more adept than Mary at assessing relevant
information (including the possibility of jail time) and formulating
a coherent action-plan. But, as Morse himself might say, we simply
132 As described by the American Bar Association, "There is, in short, no objective
basis to distinguish between offenders who were undeterrable and those who re-
mained undeterred, impulses that were irresistible and those not resisted." Criminal
Justice Mental Health Standards, supra note 3, at 341 (citing others who also make
the same type of statement).
.In this regard, consider the comments of H.L.A. Hart:
[A] theory that mental operations like... thinking about.., a situation are
somehow 'either there or not there', and so utterly outside our control, can lead
to the theory that we are never responsible... For just as [someone] might say
'My mind was a blank' or 'I just forgot' or 'I just didn't think, I could not help
not thinking' so the cold-blooded murderer might say 'I just decided to kill, I
couldn't help deciding.'
Hart, supra note 7, at 151; see also Thomas Szasz, Ideology and Insanity 271-72
(1987) (suggesting that the command-from-God cases are not different, in terms of
"intentionality," from the everyday occurrence of being asked to close a door by
someone).
N See DSM-IV, supra note 87, at 668-69 (describing the symptoms of dependent
personality disorder, including going "to excessive lengths to obtain nurturance and
support from others, to the point of volunteering to do things that are unpleasant").
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can't know whether Mary, in formulating her action-plan, found it
any harder to think about or follow reasons not to kill than some-
one in their position. Mary said "I thought I had to do it," but the
other two might (honestly) say the same thing. Indeed, the juvenile
could also plausibly argue that killing an innocent is excused when
necessary to prevent one's own death (an argument that is cogni-
zable under the Model Penal Code, although not under the
common law135). If Mary is to be excused it should be under this
type of duress theory,136 not on the unprovable judgment that it was
harder for her than for a non-mentally ill person to act for, or be
guided by, good reasons. That conclusion is bolstered by the intui-
tion that if Mary had killed the woman from the church simply to
prevent people from laughing at her, the urge to exculpate would
not be nearly as strong, regardless of her cognitive distortions.137
Mary's case is a hypothetical one. Consider three other actual
cases involving individuals charged with murder. The first case in-
volves Jon Miller.38 Shortly after his release from jail, Miller
stabbed a cab driver nine times and then raped her. Experts
learned that he had a severe hatred of his mother, apparently be-
cause of her multiple marriages and continued refusal to see him
over the years. Indeed, he had planned to kill her after his release.
135 Compare MPC Commentaries, supra note 44, § 2.09 cmt. 3, at 376 ("It is obvious
that even homicide may sometimes be the product of coercion that is truly irresisti-
ble .... This section is framed on [this] assumptiono.") with LaFave & Scott, supra
note 25, at 434 ("[The case law.., has generally held that duress cannot justify
murder.").
16 Mary would probably have to show, inter alia, that she felt the homicide was the
only way to avoid being killed by the bad people. This is similar in type to the showing
that women who rely on the battered woman syndrome try to make in attempting to
justify killing their batterer despite what might seem, to the objective observer, other
less violent options. See, e.g., State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364 (N.J. 1984).
'3 Other attempts to differentiate these three individuals don't work either. Schopp
might say that Mary should be excused because her psychopathology causes disorgan-
ized, inconsistent thinking; for example, she believes that killing is wrong one minute
and not wrong the next. See E-mail from Robert Schopp to author (Sept. 22, 1999)
(on file with author). The same might be said of the juvenile (who is likely to be very
conflicted over what he should do), and the dependent woman may never even con-
sider that killing at the behest of her lover is wrong. It might also be argued that, at
the time of the crime, Mary is not "herself' and that, once medicated, she would
never dream of killing. The same can be said of the juvenile once removed from his
gang-dominated environment and of the dependent woman once her lover is gone.
-For the relevant facts, see Miller v. State, 373 So. 2d 882, 883 n.1, 885 n.4 (Fla.
1979). Quotations in this paragraph are from these pages.
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On several previous occasions he had suffered hallucinations in
which he saw his mother in other persons, in a "yellow haze"; on
one of these occasions he assaulted the person even though the vic-
tim was a stranger .and had in no way provoked him. He was
afflicted with the same type of hallucination at the time of the
murder: He saw his mother's face on the fifty-six-year-old taxi
driver.
The second individual, Joseph Giarratano, was convicted and
sentenced to death for killing a woman and her daughter. "9 As with
Miller, Giarratano's relationship with his mother seemed to play a
role in the crime. His mother had beaten him on a daily basis, often
with a broom or a baseball bat. He stored up considerable secret
anger and resentment toward her over the years, and frequently
had fantasies of revenge. During his late adolescence, his mother
and sister began entertaining "streams of men" and his hatred of
them increased. In explaining his crime, he noted that he had also
regarded his victims as "sluts." With respect to the mother in par-
ticular he stated "I felt she deserved to die. She didn't love her
daughter; she didn't care what she was like."'"
In the first case, the defendant believes, at least for a time, that
his victim is his mother and demonstrates a very confused thought
process; he might well be excused under an irrationality test. In the
second, the defendant's reasons for acting, although also strange,
are not as irrational; probably no one but a strict determinist would
excuse Giarratano. But the two cases are not distinguishable in
terms of the defendants' ability to act for good reasons. Miller's
hallucinatory belief that his victim was his mother was presumably
no more strongly held than Giarratano's belief that his victims
were sluts. More importantly, we cannot be sure whether Miller's
belief that his mother/victim should die was any less intractable or
overpowering than Giarratano's belief that his victims deserved to
die (indeed, Miller was caught trying to escape on a bus.1 ). All we
139 For a description of this case see Richard J. Bonnie & Christopher Slobogin, The
Role of Mental Health Professionals in the Criminal Process: The Case for Informed
Speculation, 66 Va. L. Rev. 427, 469-72 (1981). Quotations in this paragraph are from
these pages.
141 Id. at 471-72.
141 See Miller, 373 So. 2d at 883 n.1. Miller was convicted of capital murder. See id. at
882.
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can be sure of is that, if the defendants did kill for the reasons de-
scribed, neither is justified in his actions, even under the Model
Penal Code's subjectified provisions. Both defendants were mother
haters who killed mother substitutes for no good reason.
Perhaps advocates of the rationality test would say that Miller
wasn't "irrational" enough to be excused. Consider a third case, in-
volving a man we shall call Ralph.142 Ralph killed his father because
he believed the father was sleeping with Ralph's wife and daughter.
This information, which was clearly wrong, had been communi-
cated to Ralph through "voices" that let him know everything his
father did. On the day of the offense, Ralph woke up and, in his
words, "found a knife by the side of my bed." He drove to his fa-
ther's house, met his father outside the house, and stabbed him
twelve times. During a post-offense interview, Ralph stated that he
knew it was not "right" to kill his father for sleeping with his wife,
but mentioned that his father had abused him as a child and that
the voices continually harped on his father's indiscretions with
Ralph's wife and daughter. Again, it is impossible to know whether
this person's ability to be guided by good reasons was any more
diminished than either that of a mentally ill person with similar be-
liefs who doesn't kill his "tormentor" or that of a non-mentally ill
person who kills when he discovers that his father is sleeping with
his wife and daughter. As Dr. Drew Ross, a psychiatrist who has
spent years evaluating murderers, notes, "psychosis may enhance
and enact the drama already present, and the drama is not neces-
sarily an innocent one."' 3
It is easy to find other examples that lead one to question
whether rationality makes sense as the culpability threshold. Some
people with paranoid schizophrenia harm those whom they inaccu-
142 This individual was interviewed by the author under a promise of confidentiality,
so the name and other identifying facts have been changed.
141 Drew Ross, Looking Into the Eyes of a Killer: A Psychiatrist's Journey through
the Murderer's World 87 (1998). Dr. Ross also states that patients with mental illness
"usually... have a good heart underlying their loss of reality." Id. But most of his ex-
amples of psychotic individuals seem to belie this point. See, e.g., id. at 83-87
(reporting the case of Mark, who killed out of delusional jealousy); id. at 91-93 (re-
porting the case of Ned, who killed during a burglary in part out of anger at his
mother); id. at 129-32 (reporting the case of Maria, who killed a hated uncle); id. at
201-04 (reporting the case of Ernest, who stabbed a young girl perhaps to prevent de-
tection or due to envy of her youth).
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rately perceive are harassing them while other paranoid individu-
als, also irrationally fearful, do not.1' At the same time, those who
are generally not irrational may be just as likely as people with
paranoid schizophrenia to react disproportionately to perceived
threats. The law books are full of cases in which sensitive but oth-
erwise normal people are convicted, albeit sometimes only of
manslaughter, when they kill a person who has slighted them."5 In
short, just as there is no measure of how hard it is to do what is
right, the existence or nonexistence of irrationality usually cannot
tell us how hard it is to perceive what is right.
C. Refining the Role of Mental Illness in Criminal Cases:
The Role of Deterrence
Any test for insanity, whether it focuses on affective apprecia-
tion, volitionality, or irrationality, is a futile attempt to define a
particular type of blamelessness: "controllessness." The question
sought to be answered is the extent to which behavioral control is
compromised due to an emotional inability to appreciate conse-
quences, a physiological/psychological inability to constrain behavior,
or a cognitive inability to perceive reality and process information.
'"The majority of those who experience paranoid delusions do not commit violent
acts against others. See Paul S. Appelbaum et al., Violence and Delusions: Data from
the MacArthur Violence Risk Study, 157 Am. J. Psychiatry 566 (2000) (reporting data
that suggests delusions do not increase the overall risk of violence in persons with
mental illness); Richard Rogers, APA's Position on the Insanity Defense: Empiricism
Versus Emotionalism, 42 Am. Psychologist 840, 842 (1987) (citing Goodwin, et al.,
Clinical Significance of Hallucinations in Psychiatric Disorders: A Study of 116 Hallu-
cinatory Patients, 24 Archives Gen. Psychiatry 76 (1971), for the proposition that
"most schizophrenics are able to ignore or otherwise control their hallucinatory activ-
ity").
145 See, e.g., Freddo v. State, 155 S.W. 170 (Tenn. 1913) (involving the case of an or-
phan defendant, particularly sensitive to insults to womanhood, who killed after being
called a "son of a bitch"); Bedder v. Director of Pub. Prosecutions, 1 W.L.R. 1119
(H.L. 1954) (involving the case of a sexually impotent and emotionally distressed de-
fendant who killed after being taunted for his inability to have intercourse). Morse
himself is candid in noting that the irrationality threshold could end up being quite
expansive. See, e.g., Morse e-mail, supra note 125 (suggesting that some addicts and
pedophiles "cannot access the good reasons not to behave badly"); see also Morse,
Culpability and Control, supra note 112, at 1636 (wondering whether psychopaths
should be excused on irrationality grounds); id. at 1649 (suggesting that "crimes of
'passion,' committed in heightened emotional states, such as fear and rage, . . : may
seal off access to the ordinary desires, beliefs, and intentions that permit volitions to
resolve the inevitable conflict by being properly responsive to ... background factors").
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Perhaps if it could be demonstrated that such people really could
not control their behavior, but rather acted as if some giant hand
propelled them into their criminal conduct against their will, then
they would be blameless." But as Morse and others have shown,
even the most severely crazy people usually intend their acts and
therefore have some control of them.' 7 And while some people do
seem to have more difficulty choosing the right behavior than oth-
ers, determining who has the most difficulty is probably impossible.
Even if someday we are able to determine whose choices are the
most difficult, it is unlikely that serious mental illness or irrational-
ity would provide the right dividing line.
For all of these reasons, the linchpin of culpability analysis
should not be rationality, appreciation, or volitionality, but rather
the mens rea and subjective justification inquiries. If the exculpa-
tory threshold is so defined, there would be no need to draw the
lines made so difficult, so unfair, and, ultimately, so meaningless by
our inability to decipher the deterministic influence. Hard deci-
sions about the presence or absence of intent, the reasons for
acting, and whether those reasons sound in justification, duress,
and so on would still have to be made.1" But none of this would re-
quire explicit or implicit determinations about whether the person
was capable of conforming behavior to the law.
To put the proposal advanced in this Article in more positive
terms: Mental disorder should have exculpatory effect when, and
only when, its effects lead to a lack of the required mens rea or to
'1 Although modem cases provide few examples of this phenomenon, Isaac Ray re-
ported several cases "in which the desire to destroy life is prompted by no motive
whatever, but solely by an irresistible impulse, without any appreciable disorder of
mind or body." Ray, supra note 28, at 149. But even in these cases the individual was
usually aware of when the "irresistible impulse" was upon him and asked to be re-
strained in some manner or clearly intended the crime. See id. at 149-51.
4 See Morse, Culpability and Control, supra note 112, at 1595-605; see also supra
note 144.
,43 For instance, in the famous Gorshen case the defense argument was that if Gor-
shen had not killed his supervisor (after being treated harshly by him), Gorshen
would have "psychically disintegrated" into a world controlled by demons. See People
v. Gorshen, 336 P.2d 492 (Cal. 1959). Under the regime proposed in this Article, the
question for the jury in that case would have been whether killing to prevent such dis-
integration is justified or at least sounds in mitigation. The command-from-God cases,
see supra text accompanying notes 20-22, also present difficult issues concerning
choice-of-evils defenses.
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reasons for committing the crime that sound in justification or du-
ress. Two ambiguities about this rule left unresolved earlier in the
Article can now be taken up: (1) What role should mental illness
play when negligence is the mens rea? and (2) When, if ever,
should ignorance of the criminal law due to mental disorder be an
excuse? Answering these questions involves not only consideration
of retributive issues, but also contemplation of the type of message
the criminal law should send to people with mental illness and
whether they will hear it.
Liability based on negligence, as defined at common law, can be
imposed even on a person whose mental disability caused a mis-
take as to result or fact, if a reasonable person would not have
made such a mistake 149 -in other words, most of the time. Sound
arguments have been made against negligence as a basis for crimi-
nal liability."° However, even the generally subjectively oriented
Model Penal Code retains negligence as grounds for conviction in a
number of situations, including homicide,"1' so that a person who
should have known of the risks attendant to his behavior will be
found liable, albeit at a lesser grade of crime. At the same time, in
line with its general orientation, the Code's definition of negligence
is decidedly more "subjective" than the common law's, because it
looks at whether the actor should have been aware of the mistake,
"considering the nature and purpose of his conduct and the circum-
stances known to him.""2 Under this definition, a person whose
mental illness leads him, erroneously yet firmly, to believe that he
is about to be killed would not be acting negligently in killing the
perceived assailant; in essence, under the Code as it would apply in
the situations addressed in this Article, negligence analysis would
normally collapse into subjective-justification analysis.
There may be one situation, however, where a person with a
mental disorder may be liable even if the criminal act was reason-
able under the circumstances known to him at the time of the
"I See LaFave & Scott, supra note 25, at 236 & n.19.
-0 See sources cited supra note 84.
5 See Model Penal Code § 210.4 (1962).
5 Id. § 2.02(2)(d) (emphasis added). Both courts and commentators have endorsed
a similar standard. See, e.g., Trujillo v. People, 292 P.2d 980 (Colo. 1956); Low, supra
note 67, at 556 ("[T]he concept of negligence takes as its base what the defendant ac-
tually knew about the situation, and asks whether an ordinary person would have
inferred from this knowledge the need for circumspect behavior.").
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crime. Both the case law and modem statutes such as the Model
Penal Code refuse to recognize an affirmative defense when the ac-
tor is responsible for the extenuating circumstances in which he
finds himself. For instance, in defining its general choice-of-evils
defense (the predicate for all of the justification defenses), the
Model Penal Code states "When the actor was reckless or negli-
gent in bringing about the situation requiring a choice of harms or
evils... the justification afforded by this Section is unavailable in a
prosecution for any offense for which recklessness or negligence, as
the case may be, suffices to establish culpability."53 Under this pro-
vision, a person with mental disability who knows that, while
unmedicated, he is prone to engage in violent behavior may be li-
able for negligent or even reckless homicide if he fails to remain on
medication and then kills--even if, at the time of the crime, his de-
lusions otherwise satisfy the elements for subjective self-defense.
The rationale for such a position is in the first instance retribu-
tive,' but can also be seen as utilitarian, to the extent a person
with mental illness can be cajoled by the commands of the criminal
law into taking his responsibility toward others seriously.'55
Similar concerns suggest that recognition of ignorance of the law
as an excuse should be limited. As noted earlier, even the most
subjective approaches to mens rea and justification doctrines do
not recognize such an excuse. Yet at least some people who inten-
tionally commit criminal acts are either unfamiliar with the concept
of crime (earlier referred to as general ignorance of the law) or be-
lieve that their particular act is consistent with the criminal law
0 Model Penal Code § 3.02(2); see People v. Decina, 138 N.E.2d 799 (N.Y. 1956).
I See generally Paul H. Robinson, Causing the Conditions of One's Own Defense:
A Study in the Limits of Theory in Criminal Law Doctrine, 71 Va. L. Rev. 1, 2 (1985)
(addressing situations where the defendant "is in some way responsible for bringing
about the conditions of his own defense"). Empirical study indicates that laypeople
consider one's culpability for bringing about one's mental condition highly relevant to
criminal responsibility. See Norman J. Finkel & Christopher Slobogin, Insanity, Justi-
fication, and Culpability: Toward a Unifying Schema, 19 Law & Hum. Behav. 447,460
(1995) (showing that, under a no-instruction condition, defendants responsible for
their mental condition were more likely to be found culpable than those who were
not).
,-1 See David Wexler, Inducing Therapeutic Compliance through the Criminal Law,
14 Law & Psychol. Rev. 43 (1990) (discussing application of a "reckless endanger-
ment" provision to mentally ill persons who fail to take medication knowing the
possible consequences, principally as a means of enhancing treatment compliance).
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(specific ignorance of the law). An example of the first type of per-
son would be an infant or someone who, from birth, has been so
retarded or mentally ill that no socialization has taken place. An
example of the second type of person would be an individual from
a culture that does not criminalize the particular behavior in ques-
tion or a person who, as a result of retardation or illness, believes
that the criminal law permits something it clearly does not, such as
killing in response to insults.156
A person who is not cognizant of any of society's constraints
cannot justly be held liable for violating those constraints. Even the
medieval tests of insanity would excuse a person who is generally
ignorant of the criminal law, 7 and the subjective mens rea concept
should be construed to achieve the same result. Such a person is
likely to lack mens rea in either the mistake-as-to-result or mis-
take-of-fact sense in any event.
The same cannot be said when the mentally disordered person
misperceives the criminal law's application in a particular instance,
however. Such a person is generally aware of societal prohibitions
and intends to commit the crime under actual or imagined circum-
stances that do not amount to self-defense or duress, but argues
that he thought the law recognized a justification'or duress defense
under those circumstances. Outside of the insanity context, the law
has been resistant to ignorance as an excuse for two reasons: evi-
dentiary concerns (how do we know that the person was ignorant
of the law and whether the ignorance was his fault?), 8 and a desire
to maintain the rule of law by ensuring that legislatures, not crimi-
nal actors, define the prohibitions of the criminal law, thus
enhancing deterrence and fairness.'59 Both concerns might be
thought to be mitigated in the insanity context: the first on the
ground that mental illness is its own excuse for being ignorant, and
the second on the ground that the integrity of the law is not threat-
ened when people known to be mentally ill define its scope. But
neither distinction is persuasive.
156 The author has interviewed a mentally retarded individual who asked whether it
was "OK" to kill someone who called him "retarded."
, See supra text accompanying notes 32-36.
Im See 1 John Austin, Lectures on Jurisprudence 498-99 (Robert Campbell, ed.,
London, John Murray 3d ed. 1869).
151 See Jerome Hall, General Principles of Criminal Law 380-83 (2d ed. 1960).
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First, even when a claim of specific ignorance is from a mentally
ill person it will normally be incredible in the type of mala in se
crimes that trigger the insanity defense. For instance, a defendant's
claim that he thought killing a taunter was justifiable homicide un-
der the law is unlikely ever to be true,1W except perhaps when the
claimant is so disordered he is generally ignorant of the law. Even
if that is not the case, notions underlying the rule of law counsel
against recognizing such a claim. Carried to its logical end, the spe-
cific ignorance excuse allows the defendant to define the scope of
self-defense and other justificatory doctrines, disregarding com-
pletely society's views on the matter. The consequent insult to the
principle of legality and the criminal law's deterrent effect might
not be significant, but it is nonetheless real."'
Limiting the exculpatory significance of ignorance of the law to
the general ignorance category avoids these problems except in
cases of the grossest disability, where the proof and legality dan-
gers are not significant. In all other respects, the proposal advanced
in this Article fully reinforces the rule of law, because an excuse
would be available only when the reasons given by the defendant
sound in justification or duress. If so, the defendant prevails, but
only after society, through the vehicle of a judge or jury, has as-
sessed the circumstances as the defendant believed them to be
from society's standpoint, thus signaling that the verdict depends
ultimately upon communal, not individual, preferences.
1, Note that the patient used as an example of this situation, see supra note 156,
asked whether such an action was justifiable, suggesting, at the least, an uncertainty
on the issue.
Mll Thus, the concerns identified in the text have led courts to reject an excuse based
on ignorance of the law due to cultural differences. See generally Paul Magnarella,
Justice in a Culturally Pluralistic Society: The Cultural Defense on Trial, 19 J. Ethnic
Stud. 65 (1991) (noting that courts do not formally recognize a "cultural defense" and
recounting only one case, People v. Kimura, No. A-091133, L.A. Super. Ct. (1985), in
which specific ignorance of the law due to culture may have played a role in mitigat-
ing punishment; even there the defendant was convicted on lesser charges). The
M'Naghten test and other right-wrong tests could be interpreted to adopt a specific
ignorance excuse, but in practice such an excuse appears to be recognized only if it is
general. Cf. State v. Crenshaw, 659 P.2d 488, 493 (Wash. 1983) ("If wrong [in
M'Naghten] meant moral wrong judged by the individual's own conscience, this would
seriously undermine the criminal law, for it would allow one who violated the law to
be excused from criminal responsibility solely because, in his own conscience, his act
was not morally wrong."); supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text (discussing the
application of the right-wrong test).
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. INSTRUiENTAL BENEFITS
The case for abolishing the insanity defense and substituting the
subjective justification and excuse defenses is strengthened by
three potential practical benefits, briefly noted here. First, such a
reform of the criminal law's approach to mental disorder should
improve the public's image of the criminal justice system. Second,
it may well reduce the stigma associated with mental illness. Third,
it should facilitate treatment of those with mental problems.
Frustration with the outcome in insanity cases has occasioned
enmity not only toward the defense itself but toward the entire le-
gal system." To some extent this reaction may stem simply from
the fact that a "factually guilty" person has escaped punishment.
But it is also due to irritation that, regardless of the truth of the
matter, "insanity" seems to be an unbounded condition that could
apply to any number of people who commit serious crime." Al-
though people with mental disorder would still be acquitted under
the proposal, the rationale for the verdict would be more palatable
to a citizenry that is often outraged by insanity verdicts. Acquitting
a person because he thought, albeit mistakenly, that he acted in
self-defense is likely to make much more sense to the public than
acquittal based on "insanity."
More broadly, abolition of the insanity defense may well have a
beneficial impact on society's view of people with mental illness.
112 As Michael Perlin has noted, "The public's outrage over a jurisprudential system
that could allow a defendant who shot an American president on national television
to plead 'not guilty' (for any reason) becam a 'river of fury' after the jury's verdict
was announced." Perlin, supra note 1, at 13. Judge Bazelon suggested that the insanity
defense had become a scapegoat for the entire criminal justice system. See David
Bazelon, The Dilemma of Criminal Responsibility, 72 Ky. LJ. 263,277 (1983-84).
6 For example, see Perlin, supra note 1, at 14-30, which recounts the statements of
William French Smith that "Itihere must be an end to the doctrine that allows so
many persons to commit crimes of violence" and of Edwin Meese that eliminating the
insanity defense would "rid... the streets of some of the most dangerous people that
are out there, that are committing a disproportionate number of crimes." Both state-
ments, by men who had served as U.S. Attorney General, are based on completely
inaccurate premises. See Melton et al., supra note 99, at 187-88 (detailing studies
showing that the insanity defense is raised in far less than 1% of criminal prosecutions
and only a small percentage of these go to trial); see also infra note 165 (detailing data
showing that people with mental disability are not abnormally dangerous). As Perlin
notes, however, these premises undoubtedly underlie the animosity toward the de-
fense and the system generally.
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Michael Perlin has written about the "sanist" attitudes of society
toward those with mental disorder.'" One particularly insidious
sanist notion, clearly belied by the data," is that those with mental
illness are abnormally dangerous, and a second notion, also incor-
rect (if one agrees with the assertions in this Article), is that they
have significantly less control over their behavior than do people
who are not "mentally ill." Some have plausibly argued that the in-'
sanity defense, by drawing a direct connection between mental
illness on the one hand and crime and nonresponsibility on the
other, bears much of the blame for these discriminatory attitudes.1"
The elimination of a special defense of insanity, and the integration
of mental illness claims into the same defensive framework used by
those who are not mentally ill, would be at least a small step to-
ward eradicating sanism. Of course, more people with mental
illness would be labeled criminal under the proposal. But the ar-
gument here is not that the criminal label is less stigmatizing to a
particular individual (although it probably is," and it is certainly
less stigmatizing than the double whammy inflicted by the phrase
"criminally insane"'"). Rather, the argument is that the insanity de-
fense unfairly perpetuates myths about mentally ill people as a
class (whereas a guilty verdict can have no analogous effect on
criminals as a class).
"A See Michael L. Perlin, On "Sanism," 46 SMU L. Rev. 373, 374 (1992) (defining
sanism as "an irrational prejudice.., of the same quality and character of other pre-
vailing prejudices such as racism, sexism, heterosexism and ethnic bigotry").
10 The most recent and sophisticated data on the subject of violence and people
with mental illness concluded that "[t]here was no significant difference between the
prevalence of violence by patients without symptoms of substance abuse and the
prevalence of violence by others living in the same neighborhoods who were also
without symptoms of substance abuse." Henry J. Steadman et al., Violence by People
Discharged from Acute Psychiatric Inpatient Facilities and by Others in the Same
Neighborhoods, 55 Archives Gen. Psychiatry 393 (1998).
16 See Judi Chamberlin, On Our Own 202 (1978) ("[A]n 'ex-mental patient' is a
code word for a violent, dangerous, unpredictable individual.").
,67 See Amerigo Farina et al., Role of Stigma and Set in Interpersonal Interaction, 71
J. Abnormal Psychol. 421 (1966) (detailing instances of mentally ill persons being de-
scribed as less desirable as friends and neighbors than criminals).
,, See Deborah C. Scott et al., Monitoring Insanity Acquittees: Connecticut's Psy-
chiatric Security Review Board, 41 Hosp. & Community Psychiatry 980, 982 (1990)
(describing survey response that called insanity acquittees the "most despised and
feared group in society").
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A third possible benefit of abolition is an improvement in the ef-
ficacy of mental health treatment for those charged with criminal
offenses. For instance, one complaint sometimes heard from men-
tal health professionals who work in forensic institutions is that
those found "not guilty" by reason of insanity, influenced by the
semantics of their verdict, refuse to admit they have done anything
wrongful; this refusal is said to inhibit treatment, which is usually
premised on an acceptance of responsibility.169 A separate, but
somewhat overlapping, impact of the insanity verdict is its labeling
effect, which may exacerbate the perceptions of those found insane
that they are dangerous outcasts with no prospects for change.7° In
contrast, to the extent the proposal advanced here leads to convic-
tion of such individuals, it should impress upon them the
seriousness of the crime and thus facilitate their rehabilitation (a
process which could well receive more attention from the correc-
tional authorities if it is no longer seen as the special preserve of
the "insane" mentally ill"1'). Even those who are acquitted may
have a more contrite and less fatalistic attitude toward change, be-
cause they will know their acquittal resulted from the precise
reasons for the offense, not because of some general trait of mental
disorder they are said to be unable to control. If so, they too may
119 See Ross, supra note 143, at 168 ("[A]ppreciation, both cognitively and emotion-
ally, of the wrongfulness of the act.., is harder to achieve for those acquitted by
reason of insanity."); Robert Fein, How the Insanity Acquittal Retards Treatment, in
Therapeutic Jurisprudence: The Law as a Therapeutic Agent 49-59 (David B. Wexler
ed., 1990); see also Joshua Dressier, Reflections on Excusing Wrongdoers: Moral
Theory, New Excuses and the Model Penal Code, 19 Rutgers L.J. 671, 689 (1988)
("[I]t is often psychologically desirable and, in any case, morally right, for a wrong-
doer to feel guilty.").
170 See Bruce J. Winick, Ambiguities in the Legal Meaning and Significance of Men-
tal Illness, 1 Psychol. Pub. Pol'y & L. 534, 603 (1995) ("People who think they lack the
capacity to control their harmful conduct because of an internal deficit that seems un-
changeable predictably will develop expectations of failure. As a result, they may not
even attempt to exercise self-control or may do so without any serious commitment to
succeed.").
171 See Richard Bonnie & Norval Morris, Debate: Should the InsanityDefense Be
Abolished?, 1 J.L. & Health 113, 119 (1986-87) (quoting Norval Morris' statement
that "the special defense of insanity ... distracts from.., the organization and alloca-
tion of such psychiatric resources as we are prepared to bring to bear on the very
serious and practical problems of the relationship between mental illness and crime").
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respond better to treatment efforts, assuming they meet the rele-
vant commitment criteria."m
Our society has too long been unjustly leery of people who are
mentally ill. Perhaps if the criminal justice system treats them more
like others, significant changes in the attitudes of both society and
those with mental illness will occur, along the lines suggested in the
foregoing paragraphs. Although this Article's justification for abo-
lition of the insanity defense is primarily retribution based, such
attitudinal change would be a welcome by-product.
CONCLUSION
This Article has argued that the insanity defense should be abol-
ished and that people with mental disorder should have a complete
defensive claim only when they lack mens rea or act for reasons
that sound in justification or duress. This position may strike some
as unduly harsh. Responding to M'Naghten's (narrower) version of
this approach, one court, writing over one hundred years ago,
stated, "It is probable that no ingenuous student of the law ever
read it for the first time without being shocked by its exquisite in-
humanity.
173
There is no doubt that, compared to current or proposed insan-
ity tests, the proposal advanced here would result in fewer
acquittals of those with mental illness. That result is not "inhu-
mane," however. If there is concern about the dispositional
consequences of convicting a person who is mentally ill, the proper
response is better rehabilitative programs for all of those who need
treatment, not a special defense that bears no necessary relation-
ship to the rehabilitative needs of its beneficiaries. 4 And the belief
2 Every state allows commitment of those who are mentally ill and dangerous, see
Reisner et al., supra note 15, at 641, the investigative stages of which should probably
be triggered by acquittal in such cases. Cf. Criminal Justice Mental Health Standards,
supra note 3, at Standard 7-7.2 (providing for evaluation of anyone found insane,
upon motion of prosecution).
m State v. Jones, 50 N.H. 369, 387 (1871).
174 One justification sometimes offered for the insanity defense is that it will ensure
treatment for those who are ill. That justification is a hoax, given the small proportion
of treatable mentally disordered offenders who are acquitted under the defense. See
T. Howard Stone, Therapeutic Implications of Incarceration for Persons with Severe
Mental Disorders: Searching for Rational Health Policy, 24 Am. J. Crim. L. 283, 285
(1997) (estimating there are 87,000 people with severe mental disorders in prison).
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that some mentally ill persons do not deserve punishment even
when they intentionally cause harm in the absence of delusion-
based justification or duress reflects misguided intuitions about
mental illness. People who are mentally disordered are not any less
able to control their behavior than many other people who commit
criminal acts. Accordingly, for purposes of the criminal law, they
should be treated the same as those who are not mentally ill.
Of course, on the latter premise, we could opt for acquittal of
many non-mentally ill people whom we currently convict. Or, be-
cause so many would thereby be excused, we might give up entirely
on culpability assessments, adopting instead a preventive regime of
the type imagined by Lady Wootton. On the twin assumptions that
the blameworthiness inquiry is essential and that this inquiry
should be based on something other than lack of control, the better
approach is to convict all of those who act intentionally and in the
absence of subjective justification or duress.
Moreover, it suggests that those who are not found insane do not deserve treatment.
Cf. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (finding that the Eighth Amendment
obligates the government to provide medical treatment for prisoners).
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